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HIGH-STAKES INTERPRETATION

Ryan D. Doerfler*
Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases. Statutory language that would otherwise be ‘unambiguous’
suddenly becomes ‘less than clear.’ This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid
dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes. The standard account of this
behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’ meanings in such cases is motivated or
disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds.
This Article challenges that account. It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult
to ‘know’ what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard that text as ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’—
when the practical stakes are raised. For that reason, this Article insists, it is entirely rational for courts to be
more cautious when interpreting text in high-stakes cases than they would be if the stakes were low. Drawing
on contemporary work in philosophy of language and epistemology, this Article grounds its argument in the
observation that ordinary speakers’ willingness to attribute ‘knowledge’ or ‘clarity’ decreases as the practical
stakes increase. And while the technical explanations of this phenomenon vary, they all reflect a basic insight:
that one needs greater epistemic justification to act on some premise the higher the practical stakes.
To illustrate, this Article applies the above insight to various interpretive settings. Considering judicial review,
for example, this Article explains that it makes good epistemic sense for a court to wait until it is really sure
that a statute means what it thinks it means before taking the extraordinary step of invalidating that statute
as unconstitutional. Similarly, this Article urges that it is just sound epistemic practice for a court is to construe
a statute in a way that would unsettle an existing implementation regime only if it is especially well justified
in its reading of the statutory text, i.e. only if it really knows that its reading is correct.
This Article thus offers at least a partial justification of courts’ seemingly loose treatment of statutory text when
the practical stakes are raised. And it does so, in contrast to prior scholarly efforts, by appeal to reasons that
both formalists and instrumentalists can accept.

We’re all textualists now[, except in June].
—

Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture, Harvard Law School
(November 18, 2015) (alteration added)

INTRODUCTION
“We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language according to its
terms.”1 Courts recite such maxims again and again.2 And, in run-of-the-mill cases,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Hrafn Asgeirsson,
William Baude, Mitchell Berman, Sophia Lee, Richard Re, and participants at the Law, Language, and
Normativity Workshop at the Surrey Centre for Law and Philosophy for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1 Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010).
2 See, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) (“[P]olicy arguments
cannot supersede the clear statutory text.”); Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016) (“Statutory
interpretation, as we always say, begins with the text. … [T]he statute speaks in unambiguous terms
….”); Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1119 (2016) (“[E]ven the most formidable argument
*
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they pretty much do as they say. As John Manning has observed, gone are the days
when courts would openly rewrite statutory language in the service of Congress’s
apparent policy aims.3 More still, courts (somewhat) reliably give effect to “plain” or
“clear” language, ostensible (or perhaps conceivable) practical downsides
notwithstanding.4 All of this suggests a new consensus that courts should prioritize
Congress’s specific instructions over its general policy ambitions—the reason being
that those instructions are the best indication of “Congress’s specific choices about
the means to carry [its policy] ends into effect.”5 Courts thus agree that a statute’s precise
contribution to the law is (at a minimum) what Congress communicates through that
statute precisely—at least, that is, where what Congress communicates is “clear.” 6
Again, the above story does reasonably well with ordinary cases. More
worrisome is how it seems to fare when the practical stakes are raised. As different
scholars have noted, courts treat statutory text as more malleable in big cases. When
considering constitutional challenges, for example, courts frequently bend over
backwards to avoid reading statutes in ways that would raise “serious constitutional
doubts.”7 The result is the adoption of what Neal Katyal and Thomas Schmidt
disparage as “tortured constructions of statutes … bear[ing] little resemblance to laws
actually passed.”8 So too in cases involving non-constitutional ‘challenges’ to major

concerning the statute’s purposes could not overcome the clarity we find in the statute’s text.” (quoting
Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S.Ct. 596, 607, n.4 (2012))); Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1895 (2013) (“Our
‘inquiry ceases [in a statutory construction case] if the statutory language is unambiguous and the
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’” (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450
(2002)) (alteration in original))).
3 John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 114 (2011) [hereinafter, Manning, The
New Purposivism] (“[T]he Court in the last two decades has mostly treated as uncontroversial its duty to
adhere strictly to the terms of a clear statutory text, even when doing so produces results that fit poorly
with the apparent purposes that inspired the enactment.”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 12 (2012) (observing that “Holy
Trinity is a decision that the Supreme Court stopped relying on more than two decades ago”).
4 See, e.g., Nichols, 136 S. Ct. at 1113; Cloer, 133 S. Ct. at 1886; Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 2034 (2012); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011).
5 Manning, The New Purposivism, supra note 3, at 115 (emphasis added); accord Ryan D. Doerfler, The
Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 827-30 (2016) [hereinafter Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error].
6 This is, to be clear, a claim about our positive law of statutory interpretation. See William Baude &
Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017). In principle, a statute’s
contribution to the law could diverge sharply from its communicative content. See Mark Greenberg,
The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39, 48 (Leslie
Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011) (observing that the phrase “legal interpretation” is ambiguous between
ascertaining the communicative content of a legal text and determining its legal significance). This claim
assumes also that the communicative content of the statute is not superseded by some other source of
law (e.g., the Constitution). See Hrafn Asgeirsson, Can Legal Practice Adjudicate Between Theories of
Vagueness, in VAGUENESS AND THE LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 95, 103-04 (Ralf
Poscher ed., 2016) (arguing that the communicative content of a statute is coextensive with its legal
content absent some “rebutting” or “undercutting” source of law).
7 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005); accord Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
8 Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change,
128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2015).
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statutes,9 where courts—and, in particular, Chief Justice Roberts—are routinely
criticized for “ignor[ing]” statutory text outright in an effort to uphold existing
implementation regimes.10
So what to make of the disparity? Is it just that courts stick to the text in lowstakes cases but are textually unbound when it matters?11 Or, only slightly more
charitably, is it that courts care about text only so much, and that, at some point,
practical or institutional interests simply outweigh? Something like this cynical (or
semi-cynical) explanation is familiar, especially as the Supreme Court issues its lateTerm decisions. Hence, Adrian Vermeule’s remark: “We have two Supreme Courts—
roughly, constrained legalism October through May, and then a free-for-all.”12
More recently, a handful of scholars have offered limited justifications of the
disparity, ultimately on instrumentalist grounds. Richard Re, for instance, has
suggested that judges consistently adhere to “clear” text, but that, for some, “purposive
and pragmatic considerations” partially determine just how clear a text needs to be to
command respect.13 Re’s explanation is that “when a statute’s central objective is at
risk or an otherwise plausible reading leads to alarming results,” it only makes sense to
“hold the text to a higher-than-normal standard.”14 Somewhat differently, Curtis
Bradley and Neil Siegel have argued in the constitutional context that whether a text
is perceived as “clear” or “ambiguous” depends in part on historical practice.15
According to Bradley and Siegel, even if a text is “clear” at the time of enactment,
subsequent activity to the contrary (e.g., a “[l]ong-settled and established practice”16 of
congressional acquiescence) can actually render that text “ambiguous,” thereby freeing
courts from textual constraint.17 In support of this striking claim, Bradely and Siegel

That is, cases in which a litigant advances an interpretation the acceptance of which would dramatically
limit the practical effect of a statute relative to the existing implementation regime.
10 George F. Will, On Obamacare, John Roberts helps overthrow the Constitution, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/john-roberts-helps-overthrow-theconstitution/2015/06/25/47d9ffde-1b67-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html; see also Ilya Somin,
How
John
Roberts
Begat
Donald
Trump,
THE FEDERALIST
(May
5,
2016),
http://thefederalist.com/2016/05/05/how-john-roberts-begat-donald-trump (attributing to the Chief
Justice “contempt for the rule of law”).
11 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. 231 (arguing that ordinary meaning serves a coordinating function in low-stakes cases).
12
Adrian
Vermeule
(@avermeule),
TWITTER
(June
27,
2016,
2:42
PM),
https://twitter.com/avermeule/status/747515425764810752.
13 Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 407, 417 (2015).
14 Id. at 421.
15 See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J.
1213 (2015) [hereinafter Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint]; Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After
Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1
[hereinafter Bradley & Siegel, After Recess].
16 N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S.
655, 689 (1929) (alteration in original)).
17 See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 1287 (allowing that “the meaning of an
otherwise clear numerical provision could become unclear” through subsequent practice).
9
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cite practical and institutional interests, claiming, for example, that crediting historical
practice shows respect for coordinate branches and helps keep old texts up-to-date.18
Both of the justifications of the high-stakes/low-stakes disparity just
mentioned are limited in that each maps onto the high-stakes/low-stakes distinction
only somewhat. Re’s account, for example, predicts that courts will treat text more
loosely if either pragmatic or purposive reasons19 cut against the otherwise “clear”
meaning of the text.20 As such, that account would have it that, even in low-stakes cases,
the presence of purposive reasons will result in more casual reading—a prediction that
runs contrary to the pattern of judicial behavior observed at the outset.21 Bradley and
Siegel’s account, by contrast, applies principally in high-stakes cases: The possible
invalidation of a long-established practice will, after all, typically render a case high
stakes.22 At the same time, the universe of high-stakes cases is plainly much larger than
that of cases involving challenges to long-established practice (e.g., major cases
involving recently enacted statutes or regulations), making that account incomplete.23
More fundamentally, though, both Re’s and Bradley and Siegel’s accounts
require that one accept the sort of instrumentalist reasoning that most proponents of
careful statutory reading reject. Re’s suggestion, for instance, that some texts be held
to “higher-than-normal standard” sets off alarm bells for those for whom the role of
a court when interpreting a statute is to determine what Congress meant by the words
that it used.24 Similarly, Bradley and Siegel’s suggestion that texts need to be kept upto-date seems to run contrary to what Larry Solum calls the “fixation thesis,” i.e. the
thesis that the meaning of a text is fixed at the time of enactment, a basic assumption
of most any version of textualism.25
As an alternative, this Article contends that one can plausibly make sense of
how courts handle text in high-stakes cases by appeal to epistemological considerations
E.g., Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 61-63.
That is, reasons reflecting Congress’s apparent policy aims (e.g., to expand health insurance coverage,
to curtail insider trading).
20 Re, supra note 13, at 417.
21 Re cites Yates v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1074 (2015), as an example of a low-stakes case in which
purposive reasons overcome an otherwise “plain” textual meaning. See Re, supra note 13, at 411-13. As
I have argued elsewhere, however, that assessment of Yates rests on a confused understanding of “plain”
meaning. See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2805431.
22 But see infra notes 125-133 and accompanying text (discussing Milner v. Dep’t of Navy 562 U.S. 562,
580-81 (2011)).
23 That is, incomplete as an explanation of the disparate treatment of text in high-/low-stakes cases. To
the extent that Bradley and Siegel set out to explain a subset of that phenomenon (or a distinct but
overlapping phenomenon), it is no discredit to their account that it fails to explain in full the
phenomenon under consideration here.
24 Cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Under all the usual rules of
interpretation, in short, the Government should lose this case. But normal rules of interpretation seem
always to yield to the overriding principle of the present Court: The Affordable Care Act must be
saved.”).
25 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, The Fixation Thesis].
18
19
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cognizable by formalists and instrumentalists alike. The argument is as follows: To
say that the meaning of a statute is “clear” or “plain” is, in effect, to say26 that one
knows what that statute means.27 As numerous philosophers have observed, however,
ordinary speakers attribute “knowledge”—and, in turn, “clarity”—more or less freely
depending upon the practical stakes.28 In low-stakes situations, speakers are willing to
concede that a person “knows” this or that given only a moderate level of justification:
Suppose, for example, Jane has checked the train schedule, uses the train system with
some regularity, and is in no particular rush; in that situation, it is plausible for Jane to
say that she “knows” that the train will arrive at 7 AM as scheduled. By contrast, if
the practical stakes are high, speakers require greater justification before allowing that
someone “knows” that same thing, holding constant that person’s evidence: If, say,
Jane has the same evidence as above but absolutely cannot afford to be late, Jane’s
claim to “know” that the train will arrive at 7 AM is more doubtful.29
As this Article explains, philosophers differ in their technical explanations of
the above phenomenon: some attribute it to the semantic connection between
“knowledge” and action,30 others suggest that we mean different things by “know” in
different practical contexts,31 and others still contend that it has to do not with
semantics but with pragmatics—very roughly, what we imply, as opposed to what we say,
when attributing “knowledge.”32 Technical disagreements notwithstanding, most
agree, however, that this pattern of linguistic behavior reflects a basic insight
concerning the relationship between epistemological and practical reason, namely that
that one needs greater epistemic justification to act on some premise the higher the practical stakes.33
Applying that basic insight, this Article urges that courts’ seemingly loose
treatment of statutory text in high-stakes cases is partially attributable to (or at least
justified by) the heightened epistemological standards that apply in high-stakes
settings. Put more colloquially, because it is more difficult to “know” what statutes
mean in high-stakes cases, it makes perfect sense that courts find “clear” or “plain”
meaning less often. And, as a result, courts will more often have license to resort to
‘gap-filling,’ i.e. non-linguistic, measures in those cases.34 Consider cases involving
Or, possibly, convey.
See Doerfler & Baude, supra note 21, at *8-9.
28 See, e.g., KEITH DEROSE, THE CASE FOR CONTEXTUALISM (2009); Jessica Brown, Contextualism and
Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres, 130 PHIL. STUD. 407 (2006); JASON STANLEY, KNOWLEDGE AND
PRACTICAL INTERESTS (2005).
29 See Stuart Cohen, Contextualism, Skepticism, and The Structure of Reasons, 13 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 57, 58
(1999) (offering an analogous example); see also infra Part II.A.
30 See STANLEY, supra note 28.
31 See DEROSE, supra note 28.
32 See Brown, supra note 28.
33 See, e.g., STANLEY, supra note 28, at 9.
34 See, e.g., Baude & Sachs, supra note 6, at 1083 (“Yet we still have to decide the case. We don’t keep
fruitlessly hunting for a hidden meaning; but neither do we tell judges to fill the gap with whatever they
think best. Instead, we use law to displace our ordinary inquiries about meaning.”); Tun-Jen Chiang &
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 537 (2013)
(“[I]f a court chooses to follow the linguistic meaning of text, it must decide how to fill in the gaps
when the linguistic meaning does not fully answer a legal dispute ....”).
26
27
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constitutional challenges. As Justice Brandeis observed, “The Court has frequently
called attention to the ‘great gravity and delicacy’ of its function in passing upon the
validity of an act of Congress.”35 As such, it comes as no surprise that courts require
a great deal of epistemological justification before acting on the premise that a statute
means X where reading the statute to mean X would raise serious constitutional
concerns. Because of the “gravity” of acting on that premise, it is, for the reasons
articulated above, more difficult for courts to “know” that the statute means X in the
context of an adjudication. This, in turn, makes it more difficult in turn for courts to
regard X as the statute’s “clear” or “plain” meaning. The range of “fairly possible”
readings for that statute thus proves greater than it would absent the looming
constitutional concern, in the sense the statute turns out, in that context, to admit of
readings other than X.36 Readings that would otherwise be reasonably regarded as
“tortured”37 thus become epistemologically available owed to the heightened practical
stakes.
To be clear, to say that it is more difficult to “know” what a statute means in a
high-stakes case is not to say that to do so is impossible. To illustrate, this Article
contrasts two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions: Bond v. United States38 and
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder.39 In Bond, this Article argues,
the Supreme Court relied explicitly upon the epistemological principle at issue here,40
but did so in the service of a plainly implausible reading—plainly implausible even
considering the heightened practical stakes of the case. In Northwest Austin, by
contrast, the Court’s reliance on that principle was implicit, but its prima facie strained
reading of the statute at issue was one arguably made plausible by the raised stakes. In
comparing these two cases, this Article efforts to show that, even in high-stakes
situations, courts remain at least somewhat textually constrained. Further, the contrast
is intended as a concession that some but not all of the observed disparity between
high- and low-stakes cases might be justified on epistemological grounds.
In terms of which cases count as “high-stakes,” this Article takes no position
except to say that a case is high stakes just in case it matters a great deal to the deciding
court and to those to whom its opinion is addressed.41 For that reason, the arguments
below depend in part on apparent subjective evaluation: only if it seems likely that the
deciding court thinks that a case matters specially should one expect that court to
proceed with the corresponding epistemic caution. On the other hand, this Article
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id.
37 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 8, at 2112.
38 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
39 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
40 See 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
41 Because judicial opinions are written for an audience, the implicit assessment of a case’s relative
importance contained in an opinion must be presumed by deciding court to be shared by that audience,
on pains of being an uncooperative interlocutor. See Stefano Predelli, Painted Leaves, Context, and Semantic
Analysis, 28 LING. & PHIL. 351, 365 (2005) (observing that successful communication depends upon
agreement among conversational participants as to what “matters”) . As such, it is not enough to render
a case “high stakes” that it matters specially to the deciding court.
35
36
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leaves open the possibility of objective critique: even if courts do (or don’t) regard
some class of cases as high stakes, one can still argue they should (or shouldn’t).
This Article has four Parts. Part I considers prior explanations of the disparity
between high-stakes and low-stakes interpretation. Part II offers an alternative,
epistemological explanation of that phenomenon, building upon the basic insight that
the degree of epistemological justification required to act on a premise increases as do
the practical stakes. Part III applies that basic insight to uncontroversially high-stakes
adjudicatory situations. It also considers situations one might think should qualify as
high-stakes—in particular, criminal adjudication—but that courts appear to regard as
low-stakes, given the ease with which they identify “plain” or “unambiguous”
meaning. In so doing, it shows that the insight this Article leverages has critical as well
as justificatory potential. Last, Part IV considers the applicability of the Article’s thesis
to constitutional interpretation. As this Part observes, the inherently high-stakes
nature of constitutional interpretation might seem to explain why courts treat
constitutional text much more loosely than statutory text. Be that as it may, this Part
concedes that courts treat constitutional text so loosely in certain instances that it
becomes fair to ask whether courts are engaged in constitutional interpretation at all.42

I. PRIOR EXPLANATIONS
This Part discusses prior accounts of courts’ disparate treatment of text in
high- and low-stakes cases. Part I.A sets out the standard account of the disparity,
according to which courts’ reluctance to identify “clear” or “unambiguous” meanings
is either disingenuous or the product of motivated reasoning. Part I.B examines a
recent, non-cynical account that attributes the disparity to the rise of a new form of
purposivism. Part I.C borrows from constitutional law, considering the “historical
gloss” approach to interpretation, pursuant to which post-enactment practice can
render a previously “clear” text “unclear” (or vice versa). As this Part argues, all of
these accounts are limited in that each promises to justify at most a subset of highstakes decisions. More still, the justifying reasons each account offers are ones that
formalists—the strongest proponents of adherence to “clear” or “unambiguous”
text—would reject.

A. Cynicism
According to the standard, cynical account, courts are reluctant to identify
“clear” or “unambiguous” meanings in high-stakes cases because the practical
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2015)
(cataloging consensus ‘readings’ of constitutional provisions that are utterly at odds with the
constitutional text).
42
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concerns raised in those cases overwhelm any commitment to textual fidelity. In its
starkest form, the standard account has it that courts outright “ignore” statutory text
in an effort to advance some political or institutional agenda.43 Or, in a slightly milder
form, the suggestion is that such agendas skew courts’ perception of statutory text in
high-stakes cases, causing them to fail to perceive “clear” or “unambiguous” meanings
apparent to the unmotivated reader. To the extent that the standard account is
justificatory, it is so in virtue of the principle that ‘the [practical] ends justify the
[interpretive] means.’ With, for example, the Paris Climate Agreement at stake, one
might (might!) forgive courts for attending to text less carefully than normal.44
Proponents of the standard account include Neal Katyal and Thomas Schmidt,
who, in a recent article, criticize the Roberts Court sharply for its treatment of statutory
text in cases involving constitutional challenges.45 As explained above, the canon of
constitutional avoidance in its modern form permits courts to reject the “most natural
reading” of a statute46 if that reading would raise “serious constitutional questions.”47
A court may, however, adopt a less-natural-but-also-less-constitutionally-doubtful
reading only if that alternate reading is “fairly possible.”48 If, by contrast, the meaning
of the challenged statute is “clear,” a court must accept it and address any
constitutional questions directly.49
Katyal and Schmidt argue that, through application of the avoidance canon,
the Roberts Court has engaged in an aggressive campaign of judicial “rewriting” of
statutes in constitutional cases, “usher[ing] in legal change” under the banner of
judicial restraint.50 According Katyal and Schmidt, the Roberts Court has appeared
“indifferent” to whether the statutory readings it adopts in constitutional cases are “at
all plausible.”51 Instead, they continue, the Court has freely endorsed interpretations
that are otherwise “unthinkable,” “abandon[ing] normal principles of statutory
interpretation whenever a serious constitutional issue looms.”52 The result is that the
Court “leaves in place … law[s] that Congress never passed and may never have
wanted to pass,” a problem made all the worse by the reality of partisan gridlock and,
See supra note 10.
See Why Insiders Think the EPA Got the Best of the Clean Power Plan Hearing Last Week, UTILITY DIVE
(October 5, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-epa-got-the-best-of-the-clean-power-planhearing/427657/ (quoting an attorney for petitioners challenging the Clean Power Plan: “I tend to agree
that if you take all of the passion of climate change and the Paris agreement out, I think EPA loses 100 … [b]ut there certainly seem to be some judges who were looking for a way to allow EPA to do
something like this, and I think that’s hard to take out of the case.”).
45 See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 8.
46 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015); accord Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2600 (2012).
47 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009).
48 United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92 (1985) (“[T]his Court will not pass on the constitutionality of
an Act of Congress if a construction of the Act is fairly possible … by which the constitutional question
can be avoided.”).
49 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 929–30 (1991).
50 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 8, at 2111-12.
51 Id. at 2112.
52 Id. at 2116.
43
44
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hence, the implausibility of legislative override.53 Katyal and Schmidt allow that the
Court’s motivations in these cases may be innocent, driven by, for example, a “desire
for narrower rulings.”54 Be that as it may, Katyal and Schmidt insist that sometimes
“distorting a statute in the name of avoidance does more violence to congressional
intent—and is therefore more countermajoritarian—than outright invalidation.”55
Sounding a more optimistic note, Jonathan Adler characterizes the Roberts
Court’s apparent loose treatment of text as an exercise of “Burkean minimalism.”56
Like Katyal and Schmidt, Adler describes the Court as ignoring the “plain meaning”
of statutory text in cases involving constitutional challenges, as well as cases involving
non-constitutional challenges to major statutes.57 According to Alder, though, the
Court’s “willing[ness] to stretch or massage relevant statutory provisions” in such cases
reflects a desire to “avoid interpretations that would require invalidating federal
statutes on constitutional grounds or would otherwise prove disruptive to the status
quo.”58 In Adler’s view, the Court seems committed in these cases not only to
respecting and deferring to the political branches—the traditional understanding of
judicial minimalism—but also to “reducing the practical impact of [its] rulings.”59
Drawing on Chief Justice Robert’s famous analogy between judges and umpires, Adler
suggests that, in the Chief Justice’s view, a good judge, like a good umpire, is one who
“avoid[s] making calls that control the outcome of the game.”60 And while Adler is
careful not to endorse this understanding of judging,61 he does offer a prima facie
justification for the Roberts Court’s “willing[ness] … to stretch statutory text,” namely
the “avoid[ance of] disruptive consequences.”62
Needless to say, the justification that Adler highlights is both highly
contestable and of limited appeal. As Adler himself points out, “strain[ing]” to read
text in ways that promote desirable outcomes—status-quo preserving or no—
threatens institutional legitimacy.63 In addition, as Katyal and Schmidt observe, efforts
to minimize judicial impact can have unintended practical consequences.64 More
fundamentally, whatever appeal this sort of practical justification has to

Id. at 2118-20.
Id. at 2114.
55 Id. at 2128.
56 Jonathan H. Adler, Anti-Disruption Statutory Construction, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 103 (2016).
57 Id.; see also id. at 119-20 (“There is often room for reasonable people to differ on the best interpretation
of a complex statute, but some of the Chief Justice’s opinions seem to stretch interpretive choices
beyond their breaking point.”).
58 Id. at 103.
59 Id. at 105.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 119 (“The analysis presented here is descriptive, not normative.”).
62 Id. at 120.
63 Id. at 105.
64 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 8, at 2163 (observing that, by merely hinting at answers to constitutional
questions via application of the avoidance canon, higher courts provide lower courts little guidance
concerning how to handle similar challenges).
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instrumentalists, formalists reject it out of hand.65 As mentioned above, any
justification resulting from the standard, cynical (or semi-cynical) account must be of
the ‘ends-justify-the-means’ variety. And that sort of justification is, for the formalist,
uncognizable per se.

B. The New Holy Trinity
The cynical account has it that courts abandon interpretive principle in highstakes cases.66 Richard Re argues, by contrast, that interpretive principle has “evolved”
in ways that helps explain the high-/low-stakes disparity.67 According to Re, although
courts no longer “rewrite” statutory language openly in the service of Congress’s
apparent policy aims, the Roberts Court in particular has come to assign significant
weight to such aims—along with other pragmatic considerations—when determining
“how much clarity is required for a text to be clear” and so to command a particular
outcome.68 The result, Re continues, is a new form of purposivism, pursuant to which
text constrains, but the degree to which it constrains depends upon nontextual
factors.69 As Re explains it, “[i]f a reading has no textual support, then no amount of
pragmatism or purpose can carry the day.”70 If, on the other hand, “a statute’s central
objective is at risk or an otherwise plausible reading leads to alarming results,” then
the approach requires overwhelming textual evidence for text to control—assuming,
that is, some minimally textually plausible alternative.71 Re dubs this approach the
“New Holy Trinity,”72 contrasting it with the old, open-rewriting brand of purposivism
associated with the now-infamous Holy Trinity Church v. United States.73
Much like Adler, Re suggests that loose treatment of text in “unusual but
pivotal” cases helps to avoid “shocking effects or disruptive consequences.”74 Unlike
Adler, however, Re does his best to translate that justification into non-instrumentalist
terms. Re hypothesizes that, by holding text to a higher standard when a surprising or
harmful result looms, courts are attempting to “adhere to clear text when it’s the
product of deliberate compromise” but to set it aside “when it springs from an

Cf. Adler, supra note 56, at 103 (“Whatever the merits of this approach, it [i]s not textualism as we’ve
come to know it.”).
66 See id. (remarking that the Roberts Court’s “preference for limiting the disruptive impact of the Court’s
decisions takes priority over any commitment to a particular interpretive technique”).
67 Re, supra note 13, at 407; see also id. at 421 (suggesting that his account make sense of the difference
between “banal” and “unusual but pivotal” cases).
68 Id. at 417.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 421.
72 Id. at 408.
73 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.”).
74 Re, supra note 13, at 421.
65
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inattentive mistake.”75 So articulated, Re’s defense of the New Holy Trinity mirrors the
standard defense of the old doctrine that “judges may deviate from even the clearest
statutory text when a given application would otherwise produce ‘absurd’ results”76—
a doctrine associated, fittingly, with the old Holy Trinity.77 As Manning explains, the
basic thought underlying the absurdity doctrine is that “legislators necessarily draft
statutes within the constraints of bounded foresight, limited resources, and imperfect
language.”78 For that reason, if a given statutory application is “absurd,” a court should
“presume[] that this absurd result reflects imprecise drafting that Congress could and
would have corrected had the issue come up during the enactment process.”79
Because Re’s defense of the New Holy Trinity is familiar, so too is the basic
objection. It is, at this point, widely recognized that Congress legislates means as well
as ends. Enacting legislation (when it happens) requires compromise, and
implementing compromise often requires adopting otherwise suboptimal means.80 As
textualists have long argued, the most feasible way for Congress to identify specific
means is for it to use specific words.81 For that reason, if courts treat precise statutory
language as a mere “proxy” of Congress’s general policy aims, they make it infeasible
for members of Congress to negotiate compromises with binding force.82 This is why
there is now a consensus that courts must enforce “clear” statutory text.83 And, as
Manning has argued, the reasons that support that consensus do not support an
exception for cases in which enforcing “clear” text would entail an “absurd” practical
outcome.84 It is, of course, entirely sensible for courts to consider the “absurdity” of
a practical outcome as evidence against a particular reading of some text.85 But once,
having taken that outcome into account, a court deems the corresponding reading
“best” nonetheless, that court would exceed its authority by setting that reading aside,
dismissing it as a mistake.86

Id. at 418.
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003) [hereinafter Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine].
77 Id. at 2403.
78 Id. at 2389.
79 Id. at 2389-90.
80 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 601 (2009) (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment) (“[A]
statute’s text might reflect a compromise between parties who wanted to pursue a particular goal to
different extents.”); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (Stevens, J.) (“Statutes are
seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their enactment may require
adopting means other than those that would most effectively pursue the main goal.”).
81 Manning, The New Purposivism, supra note 3, at 116.
82 Id.
83 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
84 Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 76, at 2392 (“Following such a course would more often
require judges to accept seemingly odd or awkward results in particular cases, but doing so would serve
important systemic values implicit in the constitutional structure—legislative supremacy, the
evenhanded application of statutes, respect for legislative compromise, and the conception of limited
judicial power implicit in rationality review.”).
85 See Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, supra note 5, at 833.
86 That is, a substantive mistake, as opposed to a linguistic mistake. See id. at 830-34.
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Unlike the old Holy Trinity, Re’s insists that courts may adopt an unnatural
reading only if that reading has “non-frivolous textual support.”87 Be that as it may,
what Re advocates is that courts reject a statute’s most natural reading on the grounds
that Congress’s choice of language is more likely owed to “inattent[ion]” than to
compromise.88 Re appears, in so doing, to suggest that courts treat precise statutory
language as a mere “proxy” for purpose—so long, that is, as that language is anything
less than crystal clear. If that’s right, the New Holy Trinity thus threatens to undermine
legislative bargains in just the same way as the old. Although it is more limited in
scope, the kind of damage caused is the same.
Another way of putting the objection is that the New Holy Trinity doublecounts legislative purpose. Again, pursuant to the New Holy Trinity, courts consider
Congress’s apparent policy aims when deciding “how much clarity is required” in order
for text to control—if a text’s most natural reading runs contrary to purpose, that
reading must be especially clear for courts to give it effect.89 The problem with tying
“clarity” to purpose, however, is that contemporary courts already consider Congress’s
apparent policy aims when determining a text’s most natural reading. As Manning
observes, in the bad old days, textualist judges were “literalists,” equating fidelity to
text with enforcement of “ordinary” meaning.90 Over time, though, textualists came
to recognize that language has meaning only in context, and so began to consider the
practical setting when making sense of a particular text.91 In a slogan, textualists now
accept that, to understand “what Congress is trying to say,” courts must have some
grasp of “what Congress is trying to do.”92 But if courts now consider legislative
purpose when figuring out how a statute is most naturally read, the question for Re
becomes, why consider purpose again when deciding how clear that most natural
reading must be to control?

Re, supra note 13, at 417.
Id. at 418.
89 Re, supra note 13, at 417.
90 Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 76, at 2456. At times, Re sounds as if he regards textualist
judges as belong the old “plain meaning” school. See, e.g., Re, supra note 13, at 421 (attributing to
textualists the principle that “legal ambiguity must be discoverable in text alone”). So understood, the
double-counting problem articulated above disappears. It does so, however, only at the cost of
rendering Re’s opponent an anachronism.
91 To illustrate, Manning considers Puffendorf’s classic example of a statute imposing criminal penalties
on any person who “drew blood in the streets.” Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 76, at 2461
(quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868)). Puffendorf concluded, quite sensibly,
that the statute should not extend to a surgeon who opened the vein of a person in the street felled by
a seizure. As Manning observes, for the old “plain meaning” textualist, Puffendorf’s conclusion is
awkward since, “[r]ead literally,” that statute seemingly extends to the surgeon. Id. For the contextualist,
by contrast, that sensible conclusion is straightforwardly available. See id. (observing that, for example,
as used “in the criminal code, one might expect the term ‘drew blood’ to describe a violent act”). For
extensive discussions of the ways in which context informs textual interpretation within a textualist
framework, see also Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 986-98 (2017)
[hereinafter Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?] (cataloging examples).
92 Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, supra note 91, at 981.
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A second objection, already mentioned, is that Re’s account predicts loose
treatment of text even in cases with low practical stakes.93 Again, according to Re,
courts’ treat text more loosely when purposive considerations cut against.94 This, in
turn, suggests that courts will read text ‘creatively’ even in low-stakes cases so long as
Congress’s apparent purpose runs contrary to a statute’s most straightforward reading.
As indicated above, that prediction appears inconsistent with judicial behavior in
recent years.95
Both of the objections above pertain to what one might call the “purposive”
branch of the New Holy Trinity, i.e. the claim that, where a text’s most natural reading
runs contrary to Congress’s apparent policy aims, a heightened standard of clarity goes
into effect. This leaves the proposal’s “pragmatic” branch, i.e. the analogous claim as
to dramatic practical consequences. For reasons articulated below, there is something
fundamentally correct about the pragmatic branch of the New Holy Trinity, even if it is
not fully theorized—as explained below, the justification for such a doctrine has not
to do with risk of Congressional mistake, but rather judicial mistake.96 If one were to
rid the proposal of its purposive branch, one could thus conceive of the New Holy
Trinity less as an alternative to the account offered here than as an early predecessor to
it.

C. Constructed Constraint
In constitutional law, a popular claim as of late is that post-enactment practice
can render constitutional text clearer or—more controversially—less clear.97
Sometimes termed the “historical gloss” approach to interpretation, in a nod to Justice
Frankfurter’s famous opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,98 the motivating
thought is that the “perceived clarity or ambiguity” of some text is attributable not just
to considerations having to do with linguistic meaning (e.g., ordinary usage, apparent
purpose), but also to non-linguistic considerations such as, for example, congressional
acquiescence to executive action or steady judicial enforcement.99 So conceived,
“textual clarity is not just some linguistic fact of the matter that exists apart from the
overall process” of constitutional implementation.100 Rather, “the clarity and

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See Re, supra note 13, at 409
95 See supra note 4 (collecting cases).
96 See infra Part II.
97 See, e.g., Bradely & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15; Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note
15; William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation (manuscript, copy on file with author).
98 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
99 Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 44.
100 Id. at 44-45.
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ambiguity of the constitutional text is,” as Bradley and Siegel put it, “partially
constructed” by subsequent practice.101
As one example, Bradley and Siegel cite the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning.102 In that case, one question before the Court was whether
the Recess Appointments Clause, which authorizes the President to fill up any
vacancies that “may happen during” a Senate recess, encompasses vacancies that come
into existence prior to the recess at issue. 103 As Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
conceded, the “most natural” reading of that language is as limiting the recess
appointment power to vacancies that come into existence during the relevant recess.104
At the same time, Justice Breyer continued, the Clause’s language at least “permits” a
“broader interpretation” according to which vacancies that arise before but persist into
the recess are included within the President’s power105—an interpretation, Justice
Breyer went on to argue, more consonant with the Clause’s “purpose.”106 As evidence
of the Clause’s “ambigu[ity],” Justice Breyer appealed to the longstanding executive
branch practice of reading that language expansively.107 In dissent, Justice Scalia
contested the linguistic availability of the majority’s interpretation, maintaining that
“no reasonable reader” would have understood the Clause’s language as the majority
suggested.108 According to Justice Scalia, to use those words to achieve that end would
have been “surpassingly odd,” in particular given the “read[y] availab[ility]” of
“alternate phrasings” that would have “convey[ed] that meaning clearly.”109 As to
executive branch practice, Justice Scalia went on to observe that appointments for
vacancies coming into existence prior to the recess at issue became common only

Id. at 45. Bradley and Siegel contrast the “historical gloss” approach to the idea of “constitutional
liquidation,” according to which uncertainties about constitutional meaning would be “worked out, or
‘liquidated,’ through decisions and practices.” “Once liquidated,” according to Bradley and Siegel, “the
meaning of the Constitution on those questions would become ‘fixed’ and so not subject to change.”
Id. at 30-31; but see Baude, supra note 97, at *34-48 (arguing that liquidation correctly understood does
not require that “liquidated” meanings be permanently “fixed”).
102 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
103 U.S. CONST, Art II, § 2, cl 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session.”).
104 Id. at 2567; see also Ryan D. Doerfler, Go Big or Go Home: The Constitutionality of Recess Appointments
Following Pro Forma Sessions of the Senate, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 975, 980-88 (2013) (providing a linguistic
analysis of this portion of the Recess Appointments Clause).
105 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567-68.
106 Id. at 2568 (“The Clause’s purpose strongly supports the broader interpretation. That purpose is to
permit the President to obtain the assistance of subordinate officers when the Senate, due to its recess,
cannot confirm them.”).
107 Id. at 2567-68 (noting, e.g., that “Attorney General William Wirt advised President Monroe to follow
the broader interpretation”); see also id. at 2570 (contending that “[h]istorical practice over the past 200
years strongly favors the broader interpretation”).
108 Id. at 2606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 2606-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (remarking that “the reasonable reader might have wondered,
why would any intelligent drafter intending the majority’s reading” have used language contained in the
Clause, thereby making that reading “awkward and unnatural”).
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around the mid-nineteenth century, and only after a great deal of contestation within
the executive branch.110
Characterizing the dispute between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia, Bradley
and Siegel observe that both accept that “historical practice might be relevant” to
constitutional interpretation, but only if “the constitutional text is ambiguous.”111 For
Justice Scalia, the text of the Recess Appointments Clause was “clear,” making postenactment practice largely irrelevant.112 For Justice Breyer, by contrast, the text of the
Clause was “ambiguous,” thus giving historical practice “significant weight.”113
According to Bradley and Siegel, this difference in perception of textual clarity is at
least partially attributable to a difference in which considerations each thought relevant
to the question of whether text is “clear.” For Justice Scalia, the clarity of the text was
shown mostly if not entirely by appeal to linguistic considerations such as ordinary
usage114—characteristic, as Bradley and Siegel observe, of originalist approaches to
constitutional interpretation.115 For Justice Breyer, on the other hand, the reason—
indeed, the “only reason”—for “s[eeking] out a possible reading” beyond the deemed
“most natural” was, seemingly, the longstanding historical practice of acting contrary
to that “most natural” reading.116 As such, the language of the Recess Appointments
Clause was actually made ambiguous, claim Bradley and Siegel, by that historical
practice.117
However it fares as an approach to constitutional interpretation,118 “historical
gloss” has ready appeal when it comes to statutes. If, for example, Adler is right that
the Court has a bias in favor of the status quo,119 one way to make sense of that ‘bias’
is as an application of “historical gloss.” Applying that framework, one could say the
Id. at 2610-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 18.
112 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2617 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Irrelevant, that is, insofar as historical practice
is evidence of something other than the original public meaning of the Clause’s language. See, e.g., Vasan
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO.
L.J. 1113, 1164-76 (2003) (discussing the (in their view, limited) probative value of early congressional,
executive, and judicial precedents to the original public meaning of the constitutional text).
113 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559, 2568.
114 See id. at 2606-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the “plain meaning” of the language at issue). As
Bradley and Siegel observe, Justice Scalia also appears moved by what he perceives as the “purpose” of
the Recess Appointments Clause. See Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 48-49. As I have
argued elsewhere, however, a drafter’s apparent purpose is a quintessentially linguistic consideration. See
Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Works?, supra note 91, at 995-98.
115 See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 1241 (observing that for most originalists,
non-linguistic considerations such as historical practice are relevant only if, on the basis of linguistic
considerations, the constitutional text is unclear); see also id. at 1241 (observing that originalists “are likely
to accept [pre-ratification practice] but not [post-ratification practice] as relevant to textual
interpretation, especially if the postratification practice occurs long after the Founding”).
116 Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 47-48.
117 Id. at 47 (“[T]he Court’s finding of ambiguity for the phrase ‘vacancies that may happen’ suggests
substantial extratextual construction”); see also Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at
1266.
118 See infra Part IV.
119 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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Court perceives otherwise “clear” text as “ambiguous” in the cases Adler cites precisely
because the “most natural reading” of the text in those cases would, if accepted, be
disruptive of, for example, the existing implementation regime. So understood, it is
not that the Court pretends to see “ambiguity” to avoid a disruptive result. Rather, it
is that the specter of disruption “constructs” unclarity where none existed before.120
Despite its appeal, “historical gloss” also has serious limitations in terms of
explaining the high-/low-stakes disparity in statutory interpretation.121 First and most
obvious, even if some high-stakes cases are plausibly situated within the “historical
gloss” framework, others are plainly not. As discussed below, cases involving nonconstitutional challenges to major statutes are, for example, uncontroversially ‘highstakes.’122 Some of those cases involve challenges to longstanding implementation
regimes and thus fit squarely within the “historical gloss” approach.123 Others such
cases, however, involve what are more or less preemptive strikes.124 And while a
nascent implementation regime is plausibly a “gloss” on the corresponding statutory
text, a historical gloss it is not.
Second, much like Re’s account, the “historical gloss” approach would seem
to predict loose treatment of text if a text’s “most natural” reading is contrary to settled
post-enactment practice, regardless of the practical stakes. Again, that prediction
appears incorrect. In Milner v. Navy,125 for instance, the Supreme Court considered
whether the Navy could invoke the Freedom of Information Act’s (FOIA’s)
exemption for an agency’s “personnel rules and practices” to withhold internal maps
pertaining to the storage of munitions.126 Below, the Ninth Circuit held that it could,
reasoning that the maps in question related to “predominantly internal” matters the
disclosure of which “presents a risk of circumvention of agency regulation.”127 In so
holding, the Ninth Circuit applied a test articulated almost three decades earlier by the
D.C. Circuit128—a test, according to Justice Breyer, “consistently followed, or
favorably cited, by every Court of Appeals to have considered the matter during the
See Strauss, supra note 42, at 28 (“If an agency has consistently adhered to a view that seems to be at
odds with the text of the statute, that might persuade a court to find a degree of vagueness or ambiguity
in the text that the court would otherwise not perceive and to defer to the agency's longstanding view.”).
121 Again, this is no discredit to the proponents of the “historical gloss” approach in the area of
constitutional interpretation. The purpose of this Part is to explore a potentially helpful analogy, not to
impute to the authors discussed the intention to explain areas of interpretation other than the one they
address explicitly.
122 See infra Part III.B.
123 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015)).
124 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)).
125 562 U.S. 562 (2011).
126 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
127 Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Milner
v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011).
128 See Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc)
abrogated by Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011). The D.C. Circuit grounded its broad reading
of the exemption in FOIA’s “secondary purpose” of “preserving the effective operation of
governmental agencies.” Id. at 1070.
120
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past 30 years.”129 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the plain meaning of the
term ‘personnel rules and practices,’ encompasses only records relating to issues of
employee relations and human resources,” and so excludes maps of explosives.130
Rejecting the more expansive reading of the relevant exemption, the Court insisted
that to accept the D.C. Circuit’s reading would require it to “flout all usual rules of
statutory interpretation.”131 The Court continued that it had “no warrant to ignore
clear statutory language on the ground that other courts have done so.”132 The Court
concluded by observing that “the Government has other tools at hand to shield
national security information and other sensitive materials,” in particular other
exemptions within FOIA.133 For that reason, the Court’s decision was likely of limited
practical significance. This despite its invalidating a (relatively) settled interpretive
practice.
Third, the appeal of “historical gloss” is limited insofar as it is fundamentally
at odds with familiar formalist approaches to interpretation. Again, Bradly and Siegel
rightly contrast the “historical gloss” approach with “originalist” and “texualist”
methods of interpretation.134 Pursuant to those methods, what a text means turns
exclusively on linguistic considerations.135 By contrast, “historical gloss” grounds
textual meaning in decidedly non-linguistic considerations, in particular political
branch practice not at all proximate to the enactment of the corresponding text. For
that reason, “historical gloss” also involves a rejection of the “fixation thesis,” a basic
premise of most any originalist or textualist theory.136 If, for example, historical
practice contrary to a text’s “most natural” reading becomes sufficiently settled, the
meaning of that text might flip, such that the ‘unnatural’ reading becomes “clear.”137
According to Bradley and Siegel, this surprising implication is a feature of the
“historical gloss” approach, not a bug. The reason is that it facilitates textual
“updating,” permitting legal texts “to evolve in response to … changing needs.”138
Milner, 562 U.S. at 585 (Breyer, J., dissenting); but see id. at 576 (Kagan, J.) (observing that “[p]rior to
Crooker, three Circuits adopted the reading of [the exemption] we think right, and they have not changed
their minds”).
130 Id. at 581.
131 Id. at 577.
132 Id. at 576.
133 Id. at 580-81.
134 Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 1216-17, 1241.
135 Such methods often do permit consideration of non-linguistic considerations to fill gaps in textual
meaning. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453 (2013) (distinguishing constitutional “interpretation,” i.e. “the activity that discovers the
communicative content or linguistic meaning of the constitutional text,” from constitutional
“construction,” i.e. “the activity that determines the legal effect given the text,” observing that “the
actual text of the U.S. Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require
constitutional construction that goes beyond the meaning of the text for their application to concrete
constitutional cases”).
136 See Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 25.
137 Perhaps the best example Bradley and Siegel provide is the consensus that the First Amendment’s
instruction that “Congress shall make no law . . . [e.g.,] abridging the freedom of speech,” U.S. CONST.
amen. I, applies not just to Congress but to all branches of the federal government. See Bradley &
Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 1243-47; but see infra Part IV.
138 Bradley & Siegel, After Recess, supra note 15, at 63.
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Needless to say, such “updating” is anathema to constitutional or statutory formalists,
for whom Article V139 and Article I, § 7140 are, respectively, of the utmost
importance.141

II. HIGH/LOW STAKES
This Article’s working hypothesis is that to say that it is “clear” (or “plain” or
“unambiguous”) that something is the case is, roughly speaking, to claim that one is in
an epistemic position to “know” it.142 Various linguistic data support this hypothesis.
Like claims about “knowledge,” claims about “clarity” appear to be factive, i.e. truthentailing.143 In addition, claims about “clarity” and claims about “knowledge” seem to
be mutually warranting, i.e. if one is warranted in claiming that something is “clear,” one
is warranted in claiming to “know” it, and vice versa.144
Building on the above hypothesis, this Part articulates an alternate,
epistemological explanation/justification of courts’ disparate treatment of text in highand low-stakes cases. Drawing on contemporary work in philosophy of language and
epistemology, it argues that courts’ hesitancy to identify “clear” or “plain” statutory
meaning in high-stakes cases is plausibly an instantiation of the more general
reluctance on the part of ordinary speakers to claim to “know” things when the
practical stakes are raised. As this Part goes onto explain, this general reluctance on
the part of speakers reflects a basic insight concerning the relationship between
epistemic and practical reason, specifically that the epistemological justification
required to act on some premise increases as do the practical stakes.

U.S. Const. art. V (establishing formal procedures for amending the Constitution).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 7 (establishing formal procedures for enacting legislation).
141 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 714 (1997)
(discussing the importance of bicameralism and presentment); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (emphasizing the value of the “long and hard consideration
required for a constitutional amendment”).
142 Unlike claims about “knowledge” (e.g., “X knows that p.”), claims about “clarity” are typically
impersonal (e.g., “It is clear that p.”). As such, claims about “clarity” appear to be indexed to a particular
body evidence (e.g., “It is clear (given the available evidence) that p.”). In turn, claims about clarity
seem to imply that those in the conversational circle have access to that body of evidence and so are in
a position to “know” the proposition at issue.
143 E.g., if I “know” that Oswald killed Kennedy, then Oswald in fact killed Kennedy. The same is true
if it is “clear” that Oswald killed Kennedy.
144 The best evidence of mutual warrant is, perhaps, the infelicity of claiming to “know” something
while denying that it is “clear,” or vice versa (“#” indicates infelicity):
# (A) I know that Oswald killed Kennedy, but it isn’t clear that he did.
# (B) It is clear that Oswald killed Kennedy, but I don’t know that he did.
For reasons below, this Article takes no position as to whether such claims are mutually entailing.
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A. Motivating Examples
In recent years, philosophers have offered various technical explanations of
the relationship between the practical stakes of a situation and the use of certain
epistemological predicates. In particular, a great deal of work has gone into making
sense of the effect changing the practical stakes has on speakers’ willingness to claim
to “know” things. This work has been motivated largely by a handful of intuitive,
everyday examples that suggest the appropriateness of “knowledge” attributions vary
according to the practical circumstances.145 Perhaps the best-known of these examples
are the so-called Bank Cases, imagined by Keith DeRose:
[LOW STAKES]: My wife and I are driving home on a Friday
afternoon. We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit
our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines
inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although
we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not
especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I
suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on
Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open
tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I
know it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s
open until noon.”
[HIGH STAKES]: My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday
afternoon, as in [LOW STAKES], and notice the long lines. I again
suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining
that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and
discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just
written a very large and very important check. If our paychecks are
not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the
important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad
situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife
reminds me of these facts. She then says, “Banks do change their
hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining
as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I
reply, “Well, no. I’d better go in and make sure.”146
A further motivation is that varying the epistemic standards required to “know” something according
to the practical circumstances has seemed to many a promising approach to solving various skeptical
puzzles. See, e.g., DEROSE, supra note 28, at 41-43.
146 Keith DeRose, Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 913,
913 (1992). The other well-known motivating example is Stuart Cohen’s so-called Airport Case:
AIRPORT: Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking a certain
flight to New York. They want to know whether the flight has a layover in Chicago.
They overhear someone ask a passenger Smith if he knows whether the flight stops
in Chicago. Smith looks at the flight itinerary he got from the travel agent and
145
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The Bank Cases are noteworthy in that they suggest that the appropriateness of
claiming to “know” something can vary with the practical stakes, holding constant the
considerations that bear on the truth or falsity of the proposition at issue (e.g., the
available evidence).147 In LOW STAKES, it seems appropriate for the speaker to claim
to “know” that the bank will be open on Saturday on the basis of his recent experience.
In HIGH STAKES, by contrast, it seems appropriate for the speaker to refrain from
claiming to “know” that the bank will be open. The speaker’s evidence concerning
whether the bank will be open on Saturday is the same in each case. The only
difference, seemingly, is that the practical consequences of mistakenly acting as if the
bank will be open on Saturday are much greater in HIGH STAKES (e.g., a bounced
check) than in LOW STAKES.
Because of the seeming connection between claiming that something is “clear”
and claiming to “know” that thing, analogous examples can, unsurprisingly, be
constructed for ascriptions of “clarity.” For instance:
ORDINARY: My wife and I are driving home on the evening of the
New Hampshire primary. We plan to stop at the polling place on the
way home to cast our votes. But as we drive past the place, we notice
that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on the day of the
primary. Although we generally like to vote, it is not especially
important in this case that we do so. All of the candidates seem
unremarkable, and all have similar policy platforms. For these reasons,
I suggest that we drive straight home, trusting that our preferred
candidate will prevail. My wife says, “Maybe she won’t win. Lots of
times turnout is the deciding factor.” I reply, “No, it’s clear she’ll win.
I checked the polls just a few days ago. She’s comfortably ahead.”
TRANSFORMATIVE: My wife and I drive past the polling place, as
in ORDINARY, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we
drive straight home, explaining that I checked the polls a few days ago
and that our preferred candidate is ahead. But in this case, the
candidate we prefer is markedly different from the other candidates,
potentially a transformative figure. If she wins, her candidacy will gain
immediate legitimacy, opening the door to a new era of American
politics. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, “As you
know, polls are wrong sometimes. Is it clear that she will win?”
respond, ‘Yes I know—it does stop in Chicago.’ It turns out that Mary and John
have a very important business contact they have to make at the Chicago airport.
Mary says, ‘How reliable is that itinerary? It could contain a misprint. They could
have changed the schedule at the last minute.’ Mary and John agree that Smith
doesn’t really know that the plane will stop in Chicago. They decide to check with
the airline agent.
Cohen, supra note 29, at 58.
147 More generally, cases of this sort suggest varying appropriateness of knowledge attributions, i.e. claims
of the form “X knows that p.”
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Remaining as confident as I was before that our preferred candidate
will win, still, I reply, “Well, no. We’d better go in and vote just to be
safe.”
Like the Bank Cases, these cases suggest that the appropriateness of claiming that
something is “clear” can vary with the practical stakes. In each case, the speaker’s
evidence concerning whether the preferred candidate will win regardless is the same.
Be that as it may, because the practical consequences of mistakenly acting as if the
preferred candidate will win are much lesser in ORDINARY than in
TRANSFORMATIVE, it seems appropriate for the speaker to claim that the election
outcome is “clear” in the former case but not in the latter.

B. Technical Explanations
Again, technical explanations of the examples discussed in Part II.A vary
(readers uninterested in the details of the various candidate explanations should skip
to Part II.C). DeRose and other so-called contextualists argue that such examples show
that attributions of “knowledge” are context-sensitive in that utterances of the form
“X knows that p” express different propositions in different contexts of use.148
So characterized, attributions of “knowledge” are much like attributions of
“tallness” or “flatness.”149 The same person, for instance, might be fairly characterized
as “tall” in a conversation about gymnastics, but not in a conversation about basketball.
The standard explanation is that to characterize someone as “tall” is to say that that
person is tall relative to some comparison class determined by the context of use. In
a conversation about gymnastics, to utter the sentence “Karen is tall” is to say, very
roughly, that Karen is tall in relation to other gymnasts. By contrast, to utter the same
sentence in a conversation about basketball is to claim, again roughly, that Karen is tall
in relation to other basketball players.
Turning back to “know,” contextualists claim that the proposition expressed
by uttering a sentence of the form “X knows that p” depends upon the practical stake
the conversational participants have in the truth of p. In a low-stakes situation, i.e. a
situation in which the truth of p matters not very much to the participants, to say that
one “knows that p” is to claim something like that one knows that p in a weak sense, i.e.
in relation to a moderately demanding epistemic standard.150 By contrast, to utter that
same sentence in a high-stakes situation, i.e. a situation in which the truth of p matters
See generally DEROSE, supra note 28.
Contextualists also analogize “know” to familiar indexicals such as “I,” “here,” and “now.” See, e.g.,
Stewart Cohen, How to be a Fallibilist, 2 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 91, 97 (1988).
150 An alternative gloss is that practical circumstances determine which possibilities are salient and so
which possibilities need to be ruled out in order to “know” something. See Stewart Cohen, Contextualist
Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery, 76 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 289, 29495 (1998).
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a great deal to the participants, is to claim that one knows that p in a strong sense, i.e. in
relation to a very demanding epistemic standard. Hence, in LOW STAKES, the
speaker is in a position to claim to “know” that the bank will be open on Saturday
because the evidence available to him satisfies a moderately demanding epistemic
standard. By contrast, because that same evidence does not satisfy a very demanding
epistemic standard, the speaker in HIGH STAKES reasonably refrains from claiming
to “know” that the bank will be open.
A second explanation, defended by so-called interest-relative invariantists such as
Jason Stanley, is that utterances of the form “X knows that p” express the same
proposition regardless of the practical stakes: that X knows that p.151 At the same time,
whether X knows that p depends, according to such authors, not just upon familiar
considerations such as X’s evidence concerning p or whether p is true, but also, quite
unconventionally, on X’s practical stake in the truth of p. As Stanley puts it, “[t]he
basic idea is that, the greater the practical investment one has in a belief, the stronger
one’s evidence must be in order to know it.”152 In other words, for interest-relative
invariantists, knowledge is fundamentally a practical concept.153
Interest-relative invariantism thus provides a straightforward explanation for
speakers’ reluctance to claim to “know” things in high-stakes situations, namely that it
is more difficult to know something if the practical stakes are raised. In LOW STAKES,
for example, the speaker can claim to “know” that the bank is open because, given the
conversational participants’ limited practical interest, knowledge requires only
moderate epistemic justification. In HIGH STAKES, by contrast, to know that the
bank will be open would require very strong epistemic justification, a degree of
justification the speaker apparently lacks. Given the conversational participants’
heightened practical interest, merely moderate justification will not do.154
A third, pragmatic explanation suggested by Jessica Brown and others is that
what varies according to the practical stakes is not the proposition expressed by an
attribution of “knowledge,” but rather whether that attribution is conversationally
appropriate.155
Here, a helpful analogy can be drawn to Paul Grice’s classic examples of
conversational implicature.156 Suppose, for instance, that A is standing by an obviously
immobilized car and is approached by B. A says to B, “I am out of petrol.” B
See generally STANLEY, supra note 28.
Id. at 88.
153 Interest-relative invariantism thus involves a rejection of what Stanley calls “intellectualism,” i.e. the
thesis that the truth of a given “knowledge” attribution turns only on familiar, truth-conducive
considerations. Id. at 6-7.
154 Put differently, to claim to “know” something is, for the interest-relative invariantist, to allege
sufficient epistemic justification for practical purposes.
155 See Brown, supra note 28; Patrick Rysiew, The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions, 35 NOÛS 477
(2001).
156 H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41 (Peter Cole & Jerry
L. Morgan eds. 1975).
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responds, “There is a garage round the corner.” As Grice observed, by uttering the
sentence “There is a garage round the corner” in this context, B implies that the garage
is (at least possibly) open and sells petrol. The reason, Grice explains, is that otherwise
B’s response to A would be conversationally irrelevant and so inappropriate.157 What
matters to B (and hence to A), practically speaking, is that she is able to secure some
petrol.
With “know,” the suggestion by Brown and others is that the proposition
expressed by uttering a sentence of the form “X knows that p” is just that X stands in
a specific epistemic relation—namely, knowing—with p. At the same time, what a
speaker communicates indirectly by uttering such a sentence can vary with the practical
stakes. Thus, in the Bank Cases, the suggestion is that the proposition the speaker
expresses is the same in each case: that he knows that the bank will be open on
Saturday. At the same time, what the speaker communicates indirectly in each case is
different. In LOW STAKES, what matters to the conversational participants,
practically speaking, is whether the speaker satisfies a moderately demanding epistemic
standard as to the bank’s being open. As such, it is conversationally appropriate for
him to say that he “knows” that the bank will be open so long as he satisfies that
moderately demanding standard. By contrast, in HIGH STAKES, what matters to the
conversational participants is whether the speaker satisfies a very demanding epistemic
standard with respect to the bank being open. Hence, in that case, it is inappropriate
for him to claim to “know” that the bank will be open if, as it seems, he fails to satisfy
that more demanding standard.
Needless to say, adjudicating between these various technical explanations of
how speakers use “know” goes beyond the scope of this Article.158 Worth mentioning,
however, is that explaining how speakers use “clear” might be a bit more
straightforward. A central objection to contextualist explanations of “know” is that
“know” does not appear to behave like other, uncontroversially context-sensitive
terms. Stanley, for example, observes that unlike “tall” or “flat,” “know” is not
obviously gradable, i.e. whereas it makes sense to describe someone as “very tall” or
“taller” than someone else, “know” has no obvious analogues.159 “Clear,” by contrast,
is plainly gradable—one can say, for example, that it is “very clear” that one’s preferred
candidate will win, or that the outcome of the gubernatorial election is “clearer” than
the outcome of the Senate race. What this suggests is that, however one makes sense
of “know,” “clear” probably admits of a contextualist explanation. Indeed, such an
explanation seems largely unavoidable: insofar as something can be more or less clear,
Id. at 51. Compare this with a situation in which A’s car is plainly in working order, and A says to
B, “I am supposed to pick up a friend at a nearby garage.” In that case, if B were to respond, “There is
a garage round the corner,” B’s utterance would have no such implication.
158 Nor is this list of candidate explanations exhaustive. See, e.g., John MacFarlane, The Assessment
Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY 197 (Tamar S. Gendler &
John Hawthorne eds., 2005) (defending an assessment-relativist account of “knowledge” attributions);
Jonathan Schaffer, From Contextualism to Contrastivism, 119 PHIL. STUD. 73 (2004) (defending a
contrastivist account of “knowledge” attributions).
159 STANLEY, supra note 28, at 37-46.
157
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context must determine how clear something must be to count as “clear” for purposes
of a given conversation.160 So construed, to claim that something is “clear” in a lowstakes situation is to say that one satisfies a moderately demanding epistemic standard
in relation to the thing at issue. By contrast, to say that something is “clear” in a highstakes situation is to claim that one satisfies a very demanding epistemic standard with
respect to that thing.

C. Basic Insight
Whichever technical explanation one prefers, a straightforward connection
between epistemic justification and practical interest comes through. On any of the
above explanations, it is appropriate to claim to “know” something only if one has
adequate epistemic justification as to that thing. And, on any of those explanations,
what counts as adequate justification depends upon the practical interests of those
involved. In a low-stakes situation, the truth of the thing at issue (e.g., that the bank
will be open on Saturday, that the preferred candidate will win the election) matters
not very much to the participants in the conversation. As such, what matters to those
participants, practically speaking, is just that someone claiming to “know” that thing
has moderate epistemic justification as to it. In a high-stakes situation, by contrast,
the truth of thing at issue matters a great deal to the conversational participants. In
those situations, then, what matters, practically speaking, is that claims to “know” that
thing be supported by very strong epistemic justification.161
The reasoning here is similar to Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis of “necessary” in M‘Culloch v.
Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 (1819). There, Marshall observed that “[a] thing may be
necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary.” Id. at 414. Because the term “admits
of all degrees of comparison,” Marshall continued, attention to “context” is necessary to determine
whether the term is best read in a “rigorous” or “more mitigated sense.” Id. at 414-15. A difference
worth mentioning, however, is that Marshall’s reasoning probably supports the more modest thesis that
appeal to context is necessary to determine whether “necessary” is used literally or, as he put it,
“figurative[ly],” id. at 414—insofar it is not obviously felicitous to say that something is “more necessary”
than something else, that “necessary” is a gradable adjective is at least controversial. By contrast, insofar
as it is plainly felicitous to say that something “clearer” than something else,” it seems comparably plain
that “clear” is a gradable adjective and, in turn, that appeal to context is necessary to determine the
threshold for “clarity” even if that term is used literally.
161 A premise of the examples considered above is that the parties involved have considered all available
evidence pertaining to their decision. A further way in which raising the practical stakes can affect our
epistemic burdens is by increasing the amount of evidence it is reasonable to consider. This is just a
corollary of the basic insight discussed above. In a low-stakes situation, it will often be reasonable to
act after considering only limited evidence, the reason being that the epistemic justification required to
act on some premise is relatively low. By contrast, in a high-stakes situation, reason will often require
that one seek out additional evidence, assuming that time permits.
Because this Article focuses on Supreme Court cases, it seems reasonable to assume that, as
in the above examples, the Court has considered all available evidence concerning statutory meaning in
both high- and low-stakes statutory cases—as a rule, the quality of advocacy before the Supreme Court
is excellent, such that even in low-stakes cases, the Court has all of the arguments in front of it. That
said, one might argue that, reasonably, the Court considers arguments more or less carefully depending
on the practical stakes of the case. If that’s right, a further albeit related reason why the Court might
160
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The coupling of epistemic justification and practical interest in our linguistic
practice lends support to an already intuitive connection between epistemic and
practical rationality. Specifically, it bolsters the principle that the epistemological
justification required to act on some premise increases as do the practical stakes. This
principle of rationality is seemingly reflected in all sorts of everyday conduct. In the
Bank Cases, for example, it is not just that it is reasonable for the speaker in LOW
STAKES to say that he “knows” that the bank will be open on Saturday; it is also
reasonable for him to act on that premise, i.e. it is okay for him to drive past the bank.
By contrast, in HIGH STAKES, it seems reasonable, even mandatory, for the speaker
to refrain from acting on that premise. Similar cases abound. The epistemic burden
for acting on the premise that one turned off the stove plausibly varies according to
whether one is leaving for the store or a week-long vacation. So too the burden for
acting on the premise that the holding of a particular Supreme Court decision was such
and such, depending on whether one is at trivia night or arguing before the Supreme
Court.
As the Bank Cases show, how to act in the absence of “knowledge” depends
upon whether one course of action constitutes “playing it safe.” In HIGH STAKES,
for example, it would be equally unreasonable for the speaker to claim to “know” that
the bank will be closed on Saturday. Be that as it may, the speaker stops and waits in
the line. In stopping, however, he acts not act on the premise that the bank will be
closed on Saturday. Rather, he acts on the premise that whether the bank will be
closed is uncertain. And under conditions of uncertainty, stopping is the safe thing to
do for the reason that the cost of stopping if the bank turns out to be open on Saturday
is much lower than the cost of driving by if it turns out to be closed.162
In addition to everyday life, the identified connection between epistemic
justification and practical interest seems manifest in our law, in particular our criminal
law.163 The increased burden of proof for criminal conviction, for example, suggests
that acting on the premise that a defendant is guilty of a criminal offense is higher
stakes than acting on the premise that she committed a civil violation. Less formally,
find “plain” meaning less often in high-stakes cases is that, upon considering the arguments more
carefully, the Court realizes that the issue is more complicated than it might have seemed given just a
cursory glance. Again, because the connection between practical stakes and duty of inquiry is just a
corollary of the basic insight discussed above, this variation of the story about why the Court behaves
as it does is not really a competing explanation. Still, it is a variation worth noting.
162 Contrast this with a situation in which neither course of action constitutes playing it safe. Suppose,
for example, that a bomb is located in one of two buildings and is set to go off in a short period of time.
Suppose further that the available evidence, although far from uniform, suggests on the whole that the
bomb is in Building A rather than Building B. Finally, suppose that, because of the time constraint, the
bomb squad can only secure one building or the other. In that paradigmatically high-stakes situation,
it would be implausible for a member of the bomb squad to claim to “know” that the bomb is in
Building A and not Building B. Be that as it may, the thing to do is for the bomb squad to rush to
Building A, acting on its “best guess” as to where the bomb is hidden. The reason is that the cost
associated with rushing erroneously to Building A or Building B is symmetrical. As such, the thing to
do under conditions of uncertainty is to act on one’s probabilistic assessment, however weak. Thanks
to Mitch Berman for suggesting this type of example.
163 But see infra Part III.C.
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the common sentiment that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is or should be
more demanding in capital cases appears to reflect a practical understanding of
“reasonable doubt.”164
This intuitive principle of rationality—again, that the epistemological
justification required to act on some premise increases as do the practical stakes—has
ready application in the area of statutory interpretation. Again, the contemporary
consensus is that courts must adhere to statutory meaning when “clear” (or “plain” or
“unambiguous”). Per this Article’s working hypothesis, for a court to say that statutory
meaning is “clear” is for it to claim to have epistemic justification to say that it “knows”
what that statute means. As such, for a court to declare statutory meaning “clear” is
for it to claim to have epistemic justification to act on the premise that the statute
means what the court takes it to mean. As the discussion above suggests, however,
what counts as epistemic justification to act on the premise that a statute has a certain
meaning depends on the practical stakes of the case. If reading a statute in a particular
way would raise no significant concerns, then moderate epistemic justification would
seem to suffice for a court to declare that meaning “clear.” If, by contrast, reading a
statute that way would have “grave consequences,”165 then rationality would seem to
require that a court have very strong epistemic justification before acting on the premise
that it should be so read.
As in the everyday life, what to do in the absence of “knowledge” of statutory
meaning depends upon whether there is a course of action that constitutes playing it
safe. By instructing courts to resolve cases on non-linguistic grounds if statutory
meaning is not “clear,” the various doctrines discussed in Part III seem to reflect the
judgment that, in the relevant cases, non-linguistic resolution is the safe course of
action under conditions of uncertainty about meaning.166 In other words, what the
various doctrines instruct is that, under conditions of uncertainty, courts should
resolve statutory cases on the basis of some value other than interpretive accuracy.167
And while the relative cost assessments contained in those doctrines are open to
question (e.g., “Is erroneous invalidation really that bad?”168), those doctrines do at

See Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt”, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 999-1000 (1993) (“Should
not ‘reasonable doubt’ be taken more seriously when a defendant’s life is at stake?” (citing state court
cases formally imposing a heightened standard for sufficiency of evidence in capital cases)).
165 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 165 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting the “grave consequences”
of deportation).
166 For cases not governed by some such doctrine, courts are probably obliged to act on their best guess
as to what the statute at issue means. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984 (2005) (contrasting cases in which courts hold that a statute’s “best
reading” is X with those in which they hold that a statute’s “only permissible reading” is X).
167 Otherwise the thing to do under conditions of uncertainty would be for a court to act on its “best
guess” as to what the statute means, i.e. to decide the case in accordance with the statute’s most natural
reading. See supra note 162. Presumably, this is what courts must do under conditions of uncertainty
absent some doctrine that authorizes case resolution on some non-linguistic basis.
168 See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 8, at 2121-22 (questioning the assumption that erroneous
invalidation is always more costly than erroneous interpretation).
164
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least provide a positive law justification for courts resolving cases on non-linguistic
grounds when statutory meaning is uncertain.

III. APPLICATIONS
This Part applies the epistemological insight identified in Part III to different
statutory interpretive settings. Part III.A considers statutory cases involving
constitutional challenges—cases the Court expressly regards as high-stakes. Part III.B
looks at cases involving non-constitutional challenges to major statutes, paradigmatic
high-takes cases from the perspective of citizens. As Parts III.A and III.B argue, the
connection between practical stakes and epistemic justification analyzed in Part II
helps to explain (or at least justify) courts seemingly loose treatment of text in these
two areas.
Part III.C discusses the potential application of the above insight to criminal
cases. As this Part observes, current treatment of text in criminal cases suggests that
courts regard such cases as relatively low-stakes. To the extent this attitude is
normatively unjustifiable, however, this Part contends that, as a purely epistemic
matter, much more aggressive application of the rule of lenity is called for.
Part III.D looks at implications for judicial deference to agency interpretations
of agency-administered statutes. As this Part explains, whether the epistemological
insight identified above recommends more or less deference depends upon which
aspect of deferring to agencies one thinks more practically or constitutionally
significant: 1) courts deferring to agencies concerning ‘what the law is,’ or 2) courts
substituting their judgment for that of agencies on questions of policy.

A. Constitutional Avoidance
According to Justice Holmes, “to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional”
is “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.”169 The
reasons courts articulate in support of this claim vary. Sometimes they cite “respect
for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.”170
Other times courts cite the “prudential concern that constitutional issues not be

Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (“The
Congress is a coequal branch of government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the
Constitution of the United States. … [W]e must have ‘due regard to the fact that this Court is not
exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath to
observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on government.’” (quoting Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951))).
169
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needlessly confronted.”171 Whatever their reasons, however, courts agree that cases
involving constitutional challenges are unambiguously high-stakes.172
Starting from that premise, this Part suggests that courts’ nonstandard
treatment of statutory text in constitutional cases is partially attributable to (or at least
justified by) the raised stakes of those cases. Again, pursuant to the canon of
constitutional avoidance, a court will not read a statute in a way that raises serious
constitutional doubts if an alternate reading is “fairly possible.”173 What this Part tries
to show is that courts’ assessment of what is “fairly possible” in such cases is rightly
affected by the perceived practical stakes.

1. Bond v. United States
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998174—which
implements the near-identically worded international Convention on Chemical
Weapons, ratified by the Senate in 1997175—prohibits the knowing “possess[ion]” or
“use” of any “chemical weapon.”176 “Chemical weapon” is defined to include any
“toxic chemical” not used for a “peaceful purpose.”177 “Toxic chemical,” in turn, is
defined as “any chemical” that can “cause death, temporary incapacitation or
permanent harm to humans or animals.”178
In Bond, federal prosecutors charged a Pennsylvania woman with two counts
of possessing and using chemical weapons in violation of the Act.179 Upon discovering
that her “closest friend” had engaged in an extramarital affair with her husband, the
defendant acquired two chemicals conceded to be “toxic to humans and, in high
enough doses, potentially lethal.”180 She proceeded to spread those chemicals on the
friend’s “car door, mailbox, and door knob,” hoping that the friend would “develop
an uncomfortable rash.”181 Though mostly unsuccessful, the defendant did cause the

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (discussing the “countermajoritarian difficulty” involved in judicial
review).
172 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
173 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
174 112 Stat. 2681–856.
175 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
176 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1).
177 Id. §§ 229F(1)(A); 229F(7)(A) (exempting the use of chemicals for “[a]ny peaceful purpose related
to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity”). The Act
contains other exemptions not relevant here. See, e.g., id. §§ 229F(7)(B)-(D).
178 Id. § 229F(8)(A).
179 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085-86 (2014).
180 Id. at 2085.
181 Id. (noting that it was “undisputed” that the defendant “did not intend to kill” her friend).
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friend to suffer a “minor chemical burn on her thumb, which [the friend] treated by
rinsing with water.”182
At first blush, application of the statute in Bond is straightforward. The
defendant’s “purpose,” after all, was evidently not “peaceful.” And the chemicals she
possessed and used were, again, “potentially lethal” and so seemingly “toxic.” Under
the “plain” meaning of the statute, the defendant thus acted in violation.183 Or so it
would seem.
On appeal, the defendant argued that her conviction should be set aside on
the ground that the Act as applied to her conduct exceeded Congress’s enumerated
powers and invaded powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.184 The
Constitution, the defendant maintained, does not permit Congress to police “local
crime,” a “bedrock principle” unaffected by the implementation of a valid, non-selfexecuting treaty.185 In so arguing, the defendant appeared to call into question the
Court’s century-old precedent Missouri v. Holland,186 which stated that “[i]f the treaty
is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute” that implements it “as
a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”187
Rather than address that constitutional question, the Court sided with the
defendant on statutory grounds, holding that the Act, interpreted correctly, did not
cover her conduct. Anticipating skepticism, the Court gestured at the epistemological
insight discussed in Part II, remarking that otherwise “clear” text can be made
“ambigu[ous]” by the “deeply serious consequences of adopting” its otherwise most
natural reading.188 As the Court observed, our “constitutional structure” leaves the
prosecution of “purely local crimes” to the States.189 As such, it continued, one should
hesitate to infer that Congress intended to “upset the Constitution’s balance between
national and local power” by “defin[ing] as a federal crime conduct readily denounced
as criminal by the States.”190 The Court emphasized further the “ordinary meaning”
of the phrase “chemical weapon” calls to mind “chemical warfare,” not “spreading
irritating chemicals on [a] doorknob.”191 For all of these reasons, the Court concluded

Id.
Id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 2087.
185 Brief for Petitioner at 2, 16-19, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12-158), 2013 WL
1963862, at *2, *16-19.
186 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
187 Id. at 432.
188 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
189 Id. at 2083, 2087.
190 Id. at 2093.
191 Id. at 2090-91.
182
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that, to whatever conduct the statute extends,192 it did not extend to this “unremarkable
local offense.”193
In dissent, Justice Scalia ridiculed the majority for its reliance upon, in his view,
a laughable if also dangerous epistemological principle.194 He likewise dismissed the
majority’s specific reasoning, insisting that, for example, the “ordinary meaning” of a
phrase is “irrelevant” when that phrase is specifically and clearly defined.195
For the reasons articulated in Part II, Justice Scalia was wrong to mock the
majority’s epistemological principle. He was right, nonetheless, to criticize the
majority’s application thereof. As Part II argues, raising the practical stakes makes it
more difficult to “know” what a statute means. It does not, however, make it
impossible to do so. Nor does it make all readings equally or even minimally plausible.
In Bond, the majority observed rightly that, given the constitutional stakes, it was more
difficult to “know” what Congress meant by “chemical weapon” than in the ordinary
case. Be that as it may, the majority put forth only minimal effort to explain why,
constitutional stakes notwithstanding, the series of seemingly precise and applicable
statutory definitions did not control the case. In terms of linguistic analysis, really all
the Court had to offer was that sometimes it “go[es] without saying” that a class of
cases is implicitly excluded from a superficially general prescription. That’s true:
sometimes, for example, “person” refers just to natural persons;196 other times
“conviction” means domestic conviction. 197 Be that as it may, the majority in Bond gave
no indication which class of cases the statute excluded implicitly (cf. corporate persons,
foreign convictions). Nor did it explain to which specific class of cases the Act was
implicitly limited.198 Such specification of Congress’s meaning is part and parcel of a
plausible linguistic story of implicit exclusion.199 Here instead the majority reasoned, in
See id. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Thanks to the Court’s revisions, the Act, which before was
merely broad, is now broad and unintelligible. ‘[N]o standard of conduct is specified at all.’” (quoting
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)). See also infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
193 Id. at 2083.
194 Id. at 2096 (“Imagine what future courts can do with that judge-empowering principle: Whatever has
improbably broad, deeply serious, and apparently unnecessary consequences ... is ambiguous!”).
195 Id.
196 Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194 (1993) (holding
that only natural “person[s]” may qualify for treatment in forma pauperis under the federal statute).
197 Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (holding that a statute making it unlawful for a person
“convicted in any court” of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to
possess a firearm refers only to domestic convictions).
198 Ironically, the defendant in Bond did suggest one such class when she argued that her conduct: fit
within the Act’s “peaceful purpose” exemption. According to the defendant, “peaceful” as used in the
Act means something like not “warlike.” See 134 S. Ct. at 2094 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because her
conduct was clearly not “warlike,” the defendant concluded, it thus fit within the “peaceful purpose”
exception. See id. As Justice Scalia observed in dissent, that reading fails for the reason that it renders
superfluous the Act’s specific exemption for the use of “self-defense devices” such as “pepper spray,”
see 18 U.S.C. § 229C, “the prosaic uses of which are surely nonwarlike.” Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094 n.2.
199 A distinguishing feature of statutory interpretation in the textualist era is that a court is expected to
supply a plausible linguistic story in support of any reading it adopts. This contrasts with an earlier era
in which providing a plausible policy story would suffice. See Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, supra note 5,
at 828-29. In recent years, Abbe Gluck in particular has praised courts for their renewed commitment
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effect, that this case was surely excluded,200 harkening back to the earlier era of ad hoc
judicial carve-outs.201

2. Northwest Austin
Bond is helpful in that it supplies a judicial gloss on the epistemological insight
discussed in Part II. Northwest Austin, by contrast, says nothing of interest. It does,
however, better show that insight in action.
Like Bond, Northwest Austin was conceived by commentators principally as a
constitutional case.202 In Northwest Austin, the plaintiff was a small Texas utility district
seeking relief from the “preclearance” requirements set forth by § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.203 Under § 5, covered “States” and “political subdivisions” are
required to obtain federal approval before changing their election laws in any way.204
Section 4(b), in turn, contains a “coverage formula” used to determine which “States”
or “political subdivisions” are subject to preclearance requirements.205 Any covered
“State” or “political subdivision” may seek relief from preclearance requirements
pursuant to the “bailout” provision contained in § 4(a).206
In Northwest Austin, the plaintiff argued that it was a “political subdivision”
within the meaning of § 4(a) and so entitled to seek bailout relief.207 As the Court
observed, there is “no dispute that the district is a political subdivision” of a covered
State “in the ordinary sense of the term.”208 It is, after all, a “division of a state that

to articulating policy stories in support of their readings. Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect
Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62 (2015)
(praising the Court for its express attention to Congress’s “legislative plans”). As I have argued
elsewhere, any defensible version of statutory analysis is attendant to Congress’s apparent practical ends.
See Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, supra note 91, at 995-98 . Be that as it may, coming
to accept readings of statutes on the basis of a plausible policy story alone, i.e. absent a plausible
supporting linguistic story, would mark a dramatic, unfortunate shift in our interpretive practice. See
supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
200 Along with an improbable hypothetical. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091 (“Any parent would be guilty
of a serious federal offense—possession of a chemical weapon—when, exasperated by the children’s
repeated failure to clean the goldfish tank, he considers poisoning the fish with a few drops of vinegar.”).
201 See Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, supra note 5, at 831-32 (analogizing Bond to the old Holy Trinity).
202 See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 181, 201-02 (“[V]oting rights experts believed that the statutory … argument had no chance ….
Instead, it seemed unavoidable that the Court would address the constitutionality of the [statute].”); see
also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009) (“Th[e] constitutional
question has attracted ardent briefs from dozens of interested parties, but the importance of the
question does not justify our rushing to decide it.”).
203 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 200.
204 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a).
205 Id. § 10303(b), invalidated by Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
206 Id. § 10303(a).
207 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 200-01.
208.Id. at 206.
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exists primarily to discharge some function of local government.”209 The problem for
the plaintiff, as the district court panel observed below,210 was that § 14(c)(2) of the
Act specifically defines “political subdivision” as “any county or parish, except that
where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or
parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts
registration for voting.”211 Because the plaintiff does not conduct voting registration,
it plainly falls outside that definition.212 As such, it seems straightforwardly ineligible
for bailout relief under § 4(a).
In addition to its statutory argument, the plaintiff in Northwest Austin argued in
the alternative that the preclearance requirements imposed by § 5 exceeded Congress’
powers under Enforcement Clause of Fifteenth Amendment and so were
unconstitutional.213 According to the plaintiff, the Act’s preclearance requirements
“differentiate[] between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the States
enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”214 As such, deviation from equal sovereignty requires
“showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the
problem that it targets.”215 The concern raised by the plaintiff is that the problem § 5
is intended to address “may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out.”
As the Court observed, “[t]he statute’s coverage formula is based on data that is now
more than 35 years old, and,” it opined, there is considerable evidence that it fails to
account for current political conditions.”216
Again, rather than address that constitutional question, the Court sided with
the plaintiff on statutory grounds, holding that the plaintiff is a “political subdivision”
for purposes of § 4(a) even if not for purposes of § 14(c)(2). According to the Court,
the definition of “political subdivision” articulated in § 14(c)(2) applied to some but
not all uses of that phrase within the Act.217 Specifically, the Court held that the
definition applied to uses of the phrase in § 4(b), but not to uses in § 4(a) or, for that
matter, § 5.218 To substantiate this claim, the Court referred to its earlier decision in
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama,219 in which it remarked that
§ 14(c)(2)’s definition applied to uses of “political subdivision” in § 4(b), but not to
those in § 5.220 Reasoning that it had established already that § 14(c)(2)’s definition
Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (8th ed. 2004)).
See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 230-35 (D.D.C. 2008),
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 129 S. Ct. 2504
(2009).
211 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(2).
212 See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 200, 206.
213 Id. at 197.
214 Id. at 203 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 208.
218 Id. See also Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidating § 4(b)’s coverage formula
on equal sovereignty grounds).
219 435 U.S. 110 (1978).
220 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 207 (citing Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 128-29, 130 n.18).
209
210
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was of limited application within the Act, the Court concluded that it was at least
plausible that that definition did not apply to § 4(a), and, in turn, that “political
subdivision” as used in § 4(a) retained its ordinary, more expansive meaning.
As the district court panel observed, the Court’s reading of § 4(a) is not without
textual difficulty.221 Specifically, § 4(a)’s bailout provision applies not to “political
subdivisions” in general, but rather to:
any political subdivision of such State (as such subdivision existed on
the date such determinations were made with respect to such State),
though such determinations were not made with respect to such subdivision as a
separate unit, or in any political subdivision with respect to which such
determinations have been made as a separate unit.222
The function of the italicized language is to make clear that a “political subdivision”
of a covered State is permitted to seek bailout relief even if that subdivision has not
been deemed subject to preclearance requirements specifically.223 In other words, even
if a subdivision is “covered” only because the State in which it exists was determined
to be “covered” pursuant to an application of the coverage formula articulated in
§ 4(b), that subdivision can request relief apart from the State as a whole.224 The
problem the italicized language creates for the Court’s analysis is that it suggests
strongly that the “political subdivisions” referred to in § 4(a) were at least eligible for
coverage determination pursuant to an application of the coverage formula in § 4(b).225
But, of course, the only “political subdivisions” eligible for a § 4(b) determination are
those that fall within § 14(c)(2)’s definition.
Under normal circumstances, the textual difficulty just identified would
seemingly be enough to render the Court’s reading of § 4(a) unavailable. What this
Part suggests, however, is that given the heightened practical stakes of the case, it is at
least plausible that the Court’s preferred reading is “fairly possible.” To see why,
consider first that the Court’s reading is not, strictly speaking, foreclosed by the
structure of the sentence in § 4(a). So long as some subset of the “political subdivisions”
referenced in § 4(a) are eligible for coverage determination pursuant to § 4(b), one can
read “political subdivision” in § 4(a) broadly without violating what Grice called the

See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 230-35 (D.D.C. 2008),
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 129 S. Ct. 2504
(2009).
222 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(2).
223 See Nw. Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
224 Prior to amendment in 1982, only “subdivisions” specifically determined to be “covered” were
eligible to request bailout relief. Id.; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 167 (1980)
(holding that a city within a covered state was ineligible for bailout relief because § 4(b) had never been
applied to it).
225 See Nw. Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (“Had Congress stopped at the comma, there might be some
question as to whether it intended to use the term “political subdivision” in its broadest sense. But
Congress did not stop at the comma.”).
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“maxim of quantity.”226 By analogy, suppose that Congress were to enact a publicfinancing system for congressional races, providing matching funds for:
any candidate who has raised in excess of $10,000 in her congressional
district, though she has not been approved for presidential-primary
matching funds, or any candidate who has been approved for
presidential-primary matching funds. 227
The eligibility criteria for President are more restrictive than those for Congress.228 As
such, not all candidates for Congress are eligible to run for President simultaneously,
or, in turn, to be considered for presidential-primary matching funds. Be that as it
may, it would be bizarre to suggest that “candidate,” as used above, referred only to
candidates eligible to run for President simultaneously.
A related but distinct worry is that the Court’s reading of § 4(a) renders the
italicized language superfluous.229 If, after all, in-State “political subdivisions” ineligible
for a § 4(b) determination are eligible for bailout relief, what is the purpose of
specifying that a subdivision need not have received such a determination? Again, under
normal conditions, this argument would have real force. Consider, though, that there
is a conceivable response. Just prior to the addition of the italicized language, the
Court had held in City of Rome v. United States230 that only “political subdivisions”
specifically designated for coverage under § 4(b) were eligible for bailout relief under
§ 4(a).231 The effect of the subsequent amendment was thus to eliminate specific
designation as a prerequisite for bailout relief. As such, even if the italicized language
is, in terms of content, redundant on the Court’s reading of § 4(b), that language could
conceivably serve to emphasize the change in the law brought about by that
amendment.232
Grice, supra note 156, at 45 (observing that “overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable
to raise side issues; and there may also be an indirect effect, in that the hearers may be misled as a result
of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of information”).
227 To receive presidential-primary matching funds, a “candidate” must, among other things, raise in
excess of “$5,000 in contributions from residents of each of at least 20 States.” 26 U.S.C. § 9033(b)(3).
228 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President;
neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five
Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.”).
229 See Nw. Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (reasoning that “[u]nder the District’s interpretation, this
language would be surplusage”).
230 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
231 Id. at 167.
232 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 209 (2009) (“In 1982, however,
Congress expressly repudiated City of Rome and instead embraced ‘piecemeal’ bailout.”). Rick Hasen
argues forcefully that the legislative history surrounding the 1982 amendment cuts against this reading.
See Hasen, supra note 202, at 205-06 (“There was no ‘express repudiation’ of City of Rome in the text of
the 1982 renewal. Indeed, City of Rome is not mentioned in the Senate Report as being repudiated.”).
Because the relevance of legislative history to statutory meaning is sharply contested, however, it seems
dubious to suggest that appeal to legislative history can render a reading not “fairly available.” See, e.g.,
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 124 (2001) (observing
that “textualists tend to be stricter in their application of clear statement rules, because they require the
226
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More generally, note that, in contrast to Bond, the Court in Northwest Austin is
able to articulate a distinctly linguistic story in support of its seemingly unusual
reading.233 As in Bond, the Court’s reading appears to be undermined by a clear,
applicable statutory definition. Unlike in Bond, however, the Court offers a specific
explanation as to why that definition is inapposite, namely that the definition applies
to certain subsections but not to others. Schematically, that explanation is familiar to
ordinary language and, for that matter, the law.234
In sum, although the Court’s reading of the statute in Northwest Austin is not
without difficulty, it is, upon closer inspection, at least not ridiculous. And, given the
high-stakes of the case, perhaps that is enough to render its reading “fairly possible.”

B. Non-Constitutional Challenges
Following the Court’s textualist turn, litigants have taken to ‘challenging’
statutes on non-constitutional grounds. Such challenges consist of a litigant advancing
an interpretation that, if accepted, would radically curtail the implementation regime
of the statute at issue. In recent years, litigants have mounted non-constitutional
challenges to a number of major statutes. These cases are, from the public’s
perspective, the very definition of ‘high-stakes.’ Up to now, such challenges have been
mostly unsuccessful. The reason, according to critics, is that courts have been willing
to stretch or even disregard statutory text to preserve the status quo.
This Part argues instead that courts’ repeated rejection of non-constitutional
challenges to major statutes is at least partially attributable to (or justified by) the
epistemic insight identified in Part II. In such cases, courts have indeed rejected
readings of statutes that would have been “clear” under ordinary circumstances.
Because of the incredibly high stakes of these cases, however, this Part suggests that
courts are epistemically rational in exhibiting extraordinary caution before accepting
readings that would have such unsettling effects.

expression of clear intent to be derived from the text of the statute, rather than in the legislative
history”).
233 See supra notes 217 -232 and accompanying text.
234 See Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“It is not unusual for the same
word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory construction
which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the Legislature intended it
should have in each instance.”).
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1. King v. Burwell
In King v. Burwell,235 the plaintiffs challenged the implementation regime of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), the most significant health
reform legislation since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid.236 As widely discussed,
the PPACA consists primarily of three interdependent reforms.237 First, the Act
prohibits insurers from denying coverage or increasing premiums on the basis of
preexisting conditions (community rating).238 Second, it imposes a tax penalty on
nonexempt individuals who fail to maintain coverage (individual mandate).239 Third,
it provides subsidies in the form of tax credits for the purchase of insurance by lowincome persons (subsidies).240 Together, community rating and subsidies help make
insurance affordable for customers by ensuring a price not in excess of a reasonable
percentage of income. At the same time, the individual mandate helps make the
provision of affordable insurance financially feasible for insurers by ensuring a broad
risk pool.
As King brought out, a concern with the above characterization is that the
specific language of the PPACA’s subsidies provision appears to limit the availability
of tax credits in a way that is largely incompatible with the Act functioning as a “threelegged stool.”241 The worry results from the Act’s permitting different types of health
insurance “Exchanges,” i.e. state-specific marketplaces on which customers can
compare and purchase insurance policies.242 Under § 1311 of the Act, “[e]ach State
shall . . . establish an [Exchange] for the State.”243 In turn, § 36B of the Internal
Revenue Code, enacted as part of the PPACA, instructs that tax credits shall be
available for persons who purchase health insurance “through an Exchange
established by the State under [§] 1311 of the [Act].”244 Because, however, Congress
cannot require states to implement federal laws,245 if a state refuses or is unable to set
up an Exchange, § 1321 of the Act provides that the federal government, through the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, “shall . . . establish and operate such
Exchange within the State.”246 As Jonathan Adler and others observed, these
provisions read together seem to suggest that the PPACA authorizes tax credits only
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
237 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485 (characterizing these reforms as “interlocking”).
238 42 U.S.C. § 300gg.
239 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.
240 Id. § 36B.
241 Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three-Legged Stool”: The Costs of Partially Repealing the Affordable
Care
Act,
CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Aug.
5,
2010),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/report/2010/08/05/8226/health-care-reformis-a-three-legged-stool/.
242 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485.
243 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1); see also id. § 18024(d) (defining “State” to mean “each of the 50 States and
the District of Columbia”).
244 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A).
245 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
246 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1).
235
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for insurance purchased on a state-run Exchange, i.e. an Exchange “established” by a
state “under [§] 1311.”247
In King, the plaintiffs challenged an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rule
interpreting the PPACA’s subsidy provision as authorizing the agency to grant tax
credits to persons who purchased insurance through either a state-run or a federally
facilitated Exchange.248 The challengers argued that the IRS rule was inconsistent with
the plain language of § 36B, which, according to them, authorizes subsidies for
insurance purchased through state-run Exchanges alone.249 At the time of the
challenge, more than half of states utilized federally facilitated Exchanges.250 Within
two years of the rule’s adoption, millions of individuals had purchased insurance
through such an Exchange, with the vast majority relying upon subsidies.251 If the
challenge were to have succeeded, health insurance would thus have been rendered
unaffordable for a huge number of would-be customers absent state or congressional
action. In turn, most of those individuals would have become exempt from the
individual mandate on grounds of financial hardship. Under these conditions, the
individual mandate would plausibly have failed to produce a broad enough risk pool
to avoid adverse selection, causing premiums to increase precipitously.252
For doctrinal reasons, the Government conceded in King that § 36B was
precisely worded, i.e. that the language at issue was not attributable to a drafting
mistake.253 Given that concession, the Government was left to argue that § 36B’s
reference to Exchanges “established by the State under [§] 1311” is a “term of art,”
encompassing state-run and federally facilitated Exchanges alike.254 Famously, the
Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that, “when read in context,” the language of § 36B
was “ambiguous,” and that although the “most natural reading” of the pertinent phrase
was as limited to state-run Exchanges, it was “also possible” that the phrase referred
to federally facilitated Exchanges as well.255 As evidence, the Court cited various
anomalies the plaintiff’s reading would produce elsewhere in the statute, requiring, for
example, the creation of federally facilitated Exchanges on which there would be no

See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The Illegal IRS Rule
to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 123 (2013).
248 Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377 (May 23, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.36B-2; 45 C.F.R. § 155.20).
249 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015).
250 Id. at 2487.
251 Id. at 2493.
252 Id. (“The combination of no tax credits and an ineffective coverage requirement could well push a
State’s individual insurance market into a death spiral.”).
253 See Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, supra note 5, at 814 (explaining that § 36B likely contains a simple
scrivener’s error, but that the error is less than “absolutely clear,” as required for recognition under
current doctrine); Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era
of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 67 (2015) (observing that King “says nothing explicit
about what the Court is to do when there is a statutory mistake—the enormous elephant that neither
party dared mention throughout the litigation”).
254 Brief for the Respondents at 13, King, No. 14-114 (U.S. June 25, 2015), 2015 WL 349885, at *13.
255 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490-91.
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“qualified individuals” eligible to shop,256 as well as the reporting of information for a
“[r]econciliation” of tax credits that could never occur.257 As to the apparent contrast
between Exchanges “established “under [§] 1311” and § 1321, respectively, the Court
observed that § 1321 instructs the Secretary to “establish and operate such Exchange
within the State.”258 “By using the phrase ‘such Exchange,’” the Court explained,
§ 1321 “instructs the Secretary to establish and operate the same Exchange that the
State was directed to establish” under § 1311.259
So was a broad reading of § 36B at least “possible”? Under normal
circumstances, the answer would seem to be no. Again, given the plain contrast
between § 1311 and § 1321 together with § 36B’s reference to Exchanges “established
under [§] 1311,” it would be “natural” infer that § 36B excludes Exchanges established
under § 1321. More still, that § 1321 instructs the Secretary to establish “such Exchange
within the State,” would suggest ordinarily that an Exchange established under § 1321
is qualitatively similar to but numerically distinct from an Exchange “established by the State
under [§] 1311.”260 And while the various anomalies to which the Court pointed are
real—and indicative of a drafting mistake261—those anomalies do not cause § 36B’s
specific language to vanish.262
As the Court noted, however, these were not normal circumstances. To accept
the plaintiffs’ reading of § 36B would have been to undermine substantially the
PPACA’s implementation regime, potentially “destabiliz[ing] the individual insurance
market in any State” with a federally facilitated Exchange.263 Under such
circumstances, it would make sense for a court to require increased epistemic
justification before regarding the “destabiliz[ing]” reading as “clear.” Whether King is
Id. at 2490 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(d)(2)(A), 18032(f)(1)(A)).
Id. at 2492 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f)(3)).
258 Id. at 2489 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1).
259 Id.
260 See Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, supra note 5, at 848 (“Suppose … that Ann instructs Beth to
purchase a blueberry pie from Hi-Rise Bakery but instructs Carl to purchase ‘such pie’ from Petsi Pies
if Beth fails. If Carl goes on to purchase ‘such pie,’ is that pie ‘purchased by Beth’? Is it also ‘from HiRise’? Doubtful.”).
261 See id. at 846-47 (arguing that these anomalies indicate that various provisions of the Act were drafted
on the assumption that it would provide only for state-run Exchanges, but that later it was amended,
albeit incompletely, to provide for federally facilitated Exchanges as a fallback).
262 Interestingly, the Court in King did, in some sense, try to make § 36B’s reference to “the State”
disappear, attributing that language to “inartful drafting.” 135 S. Ct. at 2483. As Justice Scalia explained
in dissent, however, unless the inartful drafting in question amounted to a scrivener’s error—a claim
rendered unavailable by current doctrine—it is unclear how that attribution supports the majority’s
reading. See id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps sensing the dismal failure of its efforts to show
that ‘established by the State’ means ‘established by the State or the Federal Government,’ the Court
tries to palm off the pertinent statutory phrase as ‘inartful drafting.’ This Court, however, has no freefloating power ‘to rescue Congress from its drafting errors.”‘ (citation omitted) (quoting Lamie v. U.S.
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004))). The Government, for its part, addressed this language directly, arguing
that the Secretary acts as a State’s “statutory surrogate” in establishing an Exchange, and so that an
Exchange established by the Secretary just is an “Exchange established by the State.” Brief for the
Respondents, supra note 254, at 13.
263 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
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best understood as a display of reasonable epistemic caution is, of course, open to
question.264 Also unclear is whether the Court’s preferred reading was “fairly
available,” even considering the heightened practical stakes.265 Regardless, what King
represents is a type of case in which it would be entirely reasonable, as an epistemic
matter, for a court to look at a text with more hesitation than it would in a run-of-themill case. And, if nothing else, the Court in King did look at § 36B with greater-thanusual skepticism—and it did so with an eye to the practical stakes of the case.266

2. Inclusive Communities
Whereas King was about preempting the implementation of a new statute, the
challenge in Inclusive Communities was about curtailing the implementation of an old
one.
In Inclusive Communities, the defendant was a state agency responsible for the
distribution of federal low-income housing tax credits.267 A local nonprofit sued the
agency, alleging that its “disproportionate” allocation of those tax credits—skewed
toward projects in “predominantly black inner-city areas” and away from those in
“predominantly white suburban neighborhoods”—caused segregated housing
patterns to persist in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA),268 a landmark 1968 civil
rights law.269 Importantly, the nonprofit’s was a so-called disparate-impact claim, i.e.
a claim predicated upon disproportionate adverse effects on minorities not justified by
a legitimate rationale.270 A disparate-impact claim contrasts with a claim of intentional
discrimination, i.e. a claim that a defendant acted with discriminatory intent or
motive.271
The question presented in Inclusive Communities was whether disparate-impact
claims are cognizable under the FHA. Arguing no, the defendant relied significantly
upon the “plain text” of the statute.272 In relevant part, the FHA makes it unlawful to:
refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or

As indicated above, King most likely involves a scrivener’s error rendered unspeakable by current
doctrine. See supra note 253. For that reason, it is likely that the opinion in King constitutes an attempt
to work around that doctrinal impediment. See Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, supra note 5, at 849.
265 See id. at 847-48 (discussing the weaknesses of the Government’s argument).
266 See, e.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (noting the “calamitous result” to which the challenger’s interpretation
would give rise).
267 Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 251314 (2015).
268 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
269 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2514.
270 Id. at 2513.
271 Id.; see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
272 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2537 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.273
The Act similarly provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business
includes engaging in real estate-related transactions to discriminate
against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the
terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.274
According to the defendant, because it is limited to actions taken “because of” a
protected trait, the FHA precludes disparate-impact liability. In the words of Justice
Alito, “A person acts ‘because of’ something else … if that something else ‘was the
‘reason’ that the [person] decided to act.’”275 And a protected trait is only one’s
“reason” for action if discriminatory treatment is intentional. As Justice Alito went on
to observe, “many other federal statutes use the phrase ‘because of’ to signify what
that phrase means in ordinary speech,”276 including, for example, the federal hate crime
statute, which authorizes enhanced sentences for certain crimes only if the defendant
acted with discriminatory intent.277
As in King, the Court rejected the restrictive reading of the statute proposed,
apparent textual strength notwithstanding. Holding that disparate-impact claims are,
indeed, cognizable under the FHA, the Court emphasized that the Act had long been
so understood. By 1988, the Court noted, all nine Courts of Appeals to have addressed
the question had so held.278 More still, when Congress amended the FHA that year, it
left unaltered the portions of the statute at issue—evidence, according to the Court,
that Congress had “accepted and ratified” those “unanimous” holdings.279
The Court relied, in addition, on two prior decisions in which it held that
similar “because of” language created disparate-impact liability in similar statutes.
First, in 1971, the Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.280 that provisions in Title VII
making it unlawful for an employer to make an employment decision “because of” a
protected trait of an employee or applicant encompassed disparate-impact claims.281
In Griggs, the Court based its decision almost entirely upon Congress’s apparent
purpose of “achiev[ing] equality of employment opportunities” and “remov[ing]
barriers” that have operated to the advantage of white employees.282 In a sign of an
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added).
Id. at § 3605(a) (emphasis added).
275 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2533 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting University of Tex. Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2527 (2013)).
276 Id. at 2535.
277 18 U.S.C. § 249; see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484–485 (1993).
278 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2519.
279 Id. at 2520.
280 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
281 Id. at 429-30.
282 Id.
273
274

41

earlier methodological era, the Court made no effort to explain how its holding could
be reconciled with the specific wording of the provisions at issue.283 More than thirty
years later, in Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss.,284 a plurality held that sections of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) that render unlawful
employment decisions made “because of” an employee’s or applicant’s age similarly
create disparate-impact liability.285 Recognizing the parallel with Griggs, the plurality
insisted that, despite its reliance on purpose, that decision also “represented the better
reading of the statutory text.”286 According to the plurality, because Title VII makes
unlawful actions that “deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of” a protected trait, the statute evinces
a concern not just with employer motivation but with “the effects of the action on the
employee.”287 So too, the plurality reasoned, with the ADEA, which prohibits action
that “would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of” that individual’s age.288
Returning to Inclusive Communities, the Court reasoned that, as with Title VII
and the ADEA, the language of the FHA indicates a concern not just with motive but
with consequence. Specifically, the FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to negotiate for
the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of” a protected trait.289 This, according to the Court, is the same sort of
“results-oriented language” that supported recognition of disparate-impact liability in
both Griggs and Smith.290
The Court’s reasoning on the above point is shaky. Even if the FHA (and
Title VII and the ADEA) make unlawful the bringing about of certain consequences,
unlawfulness is nonetheless contingent upon bringing about those consequences
“because of” a protected trait. In other words, even if liability can result despite one’s
having some non-discriminatory goal, it still seems that, to be liable, one’s motivation
must be discriminatory. To illustrate the contrast, suppose that a landlord were to tell
racially stereotypical jokes to minority rental applicants, intending not to dissuade
those applicants from renting, but rather to cause them to laugh. In that case, the
landlord might still be liable under the FHA for “mak[ing]” his rental property
“unavailable” to minority applicants insofar as her jokes make minority applicants
uncomfortable and so discourage them from renting. Although the landlord’s goal in
joking is innocent (e.g., to cause laughter), the consequence of her joking is not (e.g.,
to discourage minority applicants). More still, the landlord’s motivation for joking is

See Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2544 (Alito, J., dissenting).
544 U.S. 228 (2005).
285 Id. at 233-40.
286 Id. at 235.
287 Id. at 235-36 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)).
288 Id.
289 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added).
290 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2518 (reasoning that “the logic of Griggs and Smith provides strong
support for the conclusion that the FHA encompasses disparate-impact claims”).
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partially discriminatory in that one of her reasons for joking with minority applicants is
that those applicants are minorities.
So, in an ordinary case, a court would probably read the “because of” language
at issue to prohibit only intentional discrimination. That seems to be the better reading
of the statute. Indeed, under typical circumstances, one could fairly characterize that
language as “clear.” Be that as it may, the circumstances surrounding Inclusive
Communities were far from typical: to have adopted the “most natural” reading of the
statute would have been to curtail dramatically the implementation of a major civil
rights statute.291 Given those unusually high stakes, one can see how members of the
Court might reasonably have become less than certain that the “most natural” reading
was, in fact, correct. Particularly so given the longstanding judicial practice of reading
the FHA and similar statutes ‘unnaturally’—under the circumstances, considerations
of epistemic humility alone might have been enough to shake a justice’s confidence in her
own linguistic assessment.292 Thus, to the extent that courts should preserve existing
implementation regimes absent a “clear” indication from Congress,293 one can see how
the raised stakes of Inclusive Communities might make sense of (or at least vindicate) its
otherwise (textually) surprising result.

C. Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity requires courts to resolve unclarity in criminal statutes in
favor of defendants.294 The purpose of the rule is to “ensure that those subjected to
criminal prosecution have adequate notice of the conduct that the law prohibits,”295
and to prevent courts, rather than legislatures from “defin[ing] criminal activity.”296

Or, in more colloquial terms, to “gut” the FHA. E.g., Supreme Court’s Latest Race Case: Housing
Discrimination, PRO PUBLICA (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/supreme-courtslatest-race-case-housing-discrimination (remarking that “[t]any fear [the] Texas case could gut the
landmark Fair Housing Act”).
292 See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, Arguing with Friends (manuscript); Eric Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges, 105 GEO. L.J. 159 (2016).
293 Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
294 E.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (noting the Court’s “longstanding
recognition of the principle that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved
in favor of lenity.’” (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)); United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (“In various ways over the years, we have stated that ‘when choice has to
be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before
we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear
and definite.’” (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-222 (1952)));
C.I.R. v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 91 (1959) (“The law is settled that penal statutes are to be construed strictly,
and that one is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
295 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 397 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring); accord United States v. Cardiff,
344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.).
296 Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (“[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal
punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts
291
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Structurally, the rule of lenity is thus identical to the canon of constitutional avoidance:
If statutory meaning is less than clear, courts must select among available readings on
the basis of non-linguistic considerations.
Same as the avoidance canon in form, the rule of lenity could hardly be more
different in operation. As discussed in Part III.A, courts have a high threshold for
what counts as “clear” text in the face of constitutional questions. In criminal cases,
by contrast, courts’ threshold for clarity is remarkably low. Indeed, that threshold is
so low as to approach its logical limit.
In the abstract, the current approach to lenity is summarized neatly as follows:
The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity … is not sufficient
to warrant application of th[e] rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to
some degree. The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything
from which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a guess as to
what Congress intended. To invoke the rule, we must conclude that
there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.297
In other words, so long as courts have some inclination about statutory meaning, lenity
has no role to play. Functionally, then, statutory text counts as “clear” in criminal
cases so long as courts have an “opinion as to the best reading.”298 Put differently, so
long as some reading seems to courts more plausible than the others, operationally
speaking, that reading is “plainly” correct.
In the concrete, courts’ handling of criminal statutes is exemplified by the
Court’s recent decision in Lockhart v. United States.299 In that case, the question before
the Court was whether an enhanced sentencing provision applicable to defendants
with a “prior conviction ... under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual
abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward”300 applies to a
defendant whose only prior state-law conviction is for sexual abuse of an adult.301
Arguing no, the defendant in Lockhart—previously convicted under New York state
law for sexual abuse of his then-53-year-old girlfriend—contended that the participle
phrase “involving a minor or ward” binds each item in the list of predicate crimes
(“aggravated sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse,” and “abusive sexual conduct”).302 Because
his prior conviction was not for “sexual abuse … of a minor or ward,” the defendant
continued, the enhancement provision thus did not apply. In response, the
should define criminal activity.”); accord Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 704 n.18 (1995).
297 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
298 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983-84 (2005)
(contrasting decisions that expresses a court’s “opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute”
with those that identify a “statute’s clear meaning”).
299 136 S.Ct. 958 (2016).
300 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (emphasis added).
301 Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 961.
302 Id. at 961-62.
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Government argued that “involving a minor or ward” binds only the last item in the
list of predicate offenses (“abusive sexual conduct”), and so that the defendant’s prior
state-law conviction for “sexual abuse” of an adult was enough to trigger the
enhancement provision.303
Siding with the Government, the Court assured that “the provision’s text and
context together reveal a straightforward reading.”304 Writing for the majority, Justice
Sotomayor invoked what it called the “rule of the last antecedent,” according to which
a “limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or
phrase that it immediately follows.”305 Acknowledging that this “rule” reflected at best
a presumption, Justice Sotomayor went on to note the seeming parallel between the
language at issue and the chapter of the federal criminal code pertaining to “sexual
abuse,” a “prior conviction” under which triggered the same enhancement
provision.306 As Justice Sotomayor observed, the first three sections of that chapter
are titled “Sexual Abuse,” “Aggravated Sexual Abuse,” and “Sexual Abuse of a Ward
or Minor,” respectively. According to Justice Sotomayor, that “[similarity appears to
be more than a coincidence.”307 Swatting aside the defendant’s rule of lenity argument,
Justice Sotomayor thus concluded that the “text and structure of [the provision]
confirm[ed]” the Government’s reading.308
In dissent, Justice Kagan offered various ordinary conversation and legal
examples in which, intuitively, the “modifying phrase … applies to each term in the
preceding list, not just the last” (e.g., “the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the
United States”).309 In an effort to match canon with canon, Justice Kagan also invoked
what she called the “series-qualifier” canon,310 i.e. the principle that “‘[w]hen there is a
straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a
modifier at the end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’”311 Despite its

Id. at 962.
Id.
305 Id. at 962-63; see also id. at 963 (“The rule reflects the basic intuition that when a modifier appears at
the end of a list, it is easier to apply that modifier only to the item directly before it. That is particularly
true where it takes more than a little mental energy to process the individual entries in the list, making
it a heavy lift to carry the modifier across them all.”).
306 Id. at 964.
307 Id.; but see id. (“We cannot state with certainty that Congress used [the federal chapter] as a template for
the list of state predicates set out in [the enhancement provision], but we cannot ignore the parallel ….”
(emphasis added)).
308 Id. at 968 (“We will not apply the rule of lenity to override a sensible grammatical principle buttressed
by the statute’s text and structure.”).
309 Id. at 972 n.2 (quoting James v. Boise, 577 U.S. 136 S. Ct. 685, 686–687 (2016) (per curiam ))
(collecting cases); see also id. at 969 (“Suppose a real estate agent promised to find a client ‘a house,
condo, or apartment in New York.’ Wouldn’t the potential buyer be annoyed if the agent sent him
information about condos in Maryland or California?”).
310 Id. at 970.
311 Id. (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 147 (2012)).
303
304

45

“fancy name,” Justice Kagan insisted, that principle “reflects the completely ordinary
way that people speak and listen, write and read.”312
Whether Justice Sotomayor or Justice Kagan has the better reading in Lockhart
is hard to say. Commenting on the exchange, Judge Frank Easterbrook remarked that
he has no idea who is right.313 But if even arch-textualist Judge Easterbrook can’t make
heads or tails of a text, how can the rule of lenity fail to apply? The only explanation,
it seems, is that, in criminal cases, whatever reading a court deems “best” is, almost by
definition, “clear” enough to render that rule inapplicable. What this suggests is that
courts regard criminal cases as having remarkably low stakes. Indeed, if courts deem
statutory meaning “clear” in criminal cases just in virtue of having an “opinion as to
the best reading,” the attributed stakes could not be any lower.
That courts regard criminal cases as low-stakes—indeed, the lowest of
stakes—is somewhat surprising, or at least disappointing, given the special concern
with criminal conviction embedded in our constitutional and broader legal system.314
If, for example, criminal conviction “constitutes a formal judgment of [moral]
condemnation by the community,” imposing “stigma” and causing “damage to the
defendant’s reputation,”315 then surely greater epistemic caution is called for than when
adjudicating a generic civil dispute. Perhaps in an era of mass incarceration, criminal
conviction truly is run-of-the-mill.316 Still, insofar as courts at least purport to take
criminal conviction very seriously, it is disconcerting that, in practice, courts attribute
to criminal cases minimal practical significance. What this suggests, then, is that, as a
normative matter, the rule of lenity ought to look much like the avoidance canon, not
just in form, but also in operation. If criminal conviction carries with it such significant
consequences, then it seems that, as an epistemic matter, courts should be much more
hesitant to declare criminal statutes “clear.” This is not to claim that all criminal cases
are high stakes—whether, for example, some class of criminals is subject to a 10-year,
as opposed to a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence is perhaps not the most pressing

Id. Justice Kagan also questioned Justice Sotomayor’s analogy between the language at issue and the
chapter of the federal criminal code pertaining to “Sexual Abuse,” observing that, unlike the state-law
predicate offense language, the federal chapter divides “sexual abuse” into four categories: “aggravated
sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse of a ward or minor,” and “abusive sexual contact.” Id. at
975-76.
313 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2017).
314 See Hrafn Asgeirsson, On the Possibility of Non-Literal Legislative Speech, in PRAGMATICS AND LAW:
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES *1, *20-21 (Alessandro Capone & Francesca Poggi eds.,
forthcoming) (arguing that, generally speaking, the practical stakes of criminal law cases are “fairly
high”).
315 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 373 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
316 See, e.g., ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
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of issues.317 The claim here instead is just that, contrary to current practice, criminal
cases ought not to be regarded as having as low of stakes as imaginable.318

D. Chevron
Like the rule of lenity, the so-called Chevron doctrine is a rule for resolving
statutory unclarity. Pursuant to that doctrine, a court is, famously, to defer to an
agency’s reasonable construction of a statute it administers unless, as to the “precise
question at issue,” statutory meaning is “clear”319 The standard justification for so
deferring is equal parts democratic and technocratic. Unclear statutory language, the
Court has reasoned, leaves in “gaps” in the law that need to be filled, and filling those
gaps inevitably “involves difficult policy choices.”320 And because agencies are both
more democratically accountable321 and more technically expert than courts,322 it makes
sense for courts to defer to them on “how best to construe” indeterminate language
“in light of competing policy interests.”323 Based on these considerations, courts
attribute to Congress the—concededly fictional324— intention to delegate to agencies
rather than to courts the authority to resolve such unclarity.325
In recent years, various judges and justices, principally on the right side of the
political spectrum, have hinted or outright declared that Chevron should be
reconsidered. Justice Thomas, for example, has argued that relying upon agencies to
resolve statutory unclarity violates the separation of powers.326 Drawing on the work
Nor is it to suggest that all criminal cases are created equal. Surely some criminal cases are higher
stakes than others (e.g., cases involving the applicability of severe penalties). In turn, one would expect
courts to apply the rule of lenity more or less aggressively depending upon the stakes of the particular
case.
318 Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 305, 319
(2010) (reminding that a “low-stakes decision” is not “zero-stakes decision”).
319 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (“[T]he court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). See
also Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009)
(explaining that an agency’s interpretation is “reasonable” so long as it is among “the set of
interpretations which the statute does not clearly prohibit”).
320 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
321 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (observing that judges “have no constituency” and “have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do”).
322 See Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2726 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Far more than courts,
agencies have the expertise and experience necessary to design regulatory processes suited to ‘a technical
and complex arena.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863)).
323 City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013).
324 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516-17;
but see Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, supra note 91, at 1022-31 (arguing that all
attributions of legislative intent are fictional in character, but that such attributions are evaluable as apt
or inapt nonetheless).
325 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
326 See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of
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of Phillip Hamburger, Justice Thomas has asserted that “the judicial power, as
originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent judgment in
interpreting and expounding upon the laws.”327 And because “[t]hose who ratified the
Constitution knew that legal texts would often contain ambiguities,” a court’s
obligation includes “resolv[ing] these ambiguities over time.”328 Deploying less heavy
artillery,329 Justice Scalia, in some of his later administrative law opinions, appeared to
suggest that deferring to an agency construction of an agency-administered statute is
inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s) instruction that a
“reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret ... statutory
provisions.”330 Though Justice Scalia went on to assure that Chevron “at least was in
conformity with the long history of judicial review of executive action,”331 others such
as Aditya Bamzai have called that historical claim into question.332
Assessing the merits of these critiques goes beyond the scope of this Article.333
Here, instead, the thing to observe is that what a court makes of these critiques—as
well as the doctrine’s justification—is likely to affect, for purely epistemic reasons, how
freely it defers to agencies under the current regime. Start with the determination
whether the Chevron framework applies to the dispute in question, so-called Chevron
Step Zero.334 As first articulated, Chevron appeared a generic framework for disputes
involving agency-administered statutes.335 Over time, however, courts indicated a
willingness to sort among administrative law disputes by type,336 considering whether,
for example, the Chevron framework applied to disputes concerning an agency’s
Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1241-45 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217-20 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
327 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1217-18 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (citing PHILLIP HAMBURGER, LAW
AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2004)); see also PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?
(2014).
328 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
329 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2017) (criticizing the deployment of “heavy constitutional artillery” against the doctrine
that courts should defer to reasonable agency constructions of unclear regulations).
330See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706).
331 Id.
332 Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2016).
Bamzai urges that the “most natural reading” of the APA is that it restores what he terms the
“traditional” approach to deference to agencies. Id. at 987. On that approach, courts ‘defer’ to an
agency’s construction only if “contemporaneous” with the enactment of the statute at issue, or reflective
of the “customary” interpretation thereof. Id. at 916. As Bamzai points out, neither of these grounds
for deferring to executive agencies is “because they [a]re executive as such.” Id. at 941.
333 For a forceful rejoinder, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural
Aims of Administrative Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41.
334 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
335 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 324, at 511 (characterizing Chevron as “announc[ing] the principle that the
courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous terms of a statute that the
agency administers”).
336 Courts have never gone so far as to adopt Justice Breyer’s recommended approach of determining
Chevron’s applicability case-by-case, at least not explicitly. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions
of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 397-98 (1986); see also Scalia, supra note 324, at 516
(characterizing pre-Chevron as adhering to a case-by-case approach to deference).
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jurisdiction337 or ones involving questions of “deep ‘economic and political
significance.’”338 In each instance, the question presented was whether Congress
would really intend to delegate to agencies rather than to courts the authority to make
decisions of this type.339 So characterized, one can see how a court’s (or an individual
judge’s or justice’s) receptiveness to Step Zero arguments might be affected, for purely
epistemic reasons, by its attitude toward Chevron in general: To the extent that a court
(or individual judge or justice) regards deferring to agencies as constitutionally dubious,
that court would reasonably demand heightened epistemic justification before acting
on the premise that Congress intends to delegate such decisionmaking authority to
agencies over some class of disputes. By contrast, if a court (or individual judge or
justice) does not share that worry, it would require only ordinary epistemic justification
before acting on that premise.
Turn next to the determination whether Congress has spoken “clearly” in an
individual case. Here, the epistemic situation reverses. For Chevron proponents—
unmoved by Hamburger-ian critiques and persuaded by supporting democratic and
technocratic arguments—the risky premise upon which to act is that Congress has
answered the “precise question at issue.” To explain: It is common ground among
proponents and detractors of deference that “law” gives out at some point, after which
there are questions of “policy.”340 For proponents of deference, or at least strong
proponents of deference, the worrisome prospect is less of agencies exercising judicial
authority than of courts making policy in complex areas absent technical competence
or democratic mandate.341 Given that concern, it makes sense for strong proponents
to require increased epistemic justification before acting on the premise that Congress
has spoken “clearly” on a particular question. By contrast, for those not disturbed by
prospect of judicial policymaking, ordinary epistemic justification should suffice
before acting on the premise that “law” settles the dispute at issue.
Whether this is how things play out in practice is tough to assess. Chief Justice
Roberts, a consistent critic of Chevron, has also been a consistent vote in favor of

City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S.
Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
339 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“[H]ad Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely
would have done so expressly.”).
340 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Common Law (reviewing JOHN DICKINSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (2004)), NEW
RAMBLER REV. (2016).
341 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J.
2580 (2006) (“Chevron is best taken as a vindication of the realist claim that resolution of statutory
ambiguities often calls for judgments of policy and principle. … The meaning of statutory enactments
is no brooding omnipresence in the sky. Chevron is our Erie, and much of the time, it is emphatically
the province and duty of the executive branch to say what the law is.”); see also ADRIAN VERMEULE,
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 217
(2006) (arguing that the best “justification for Chevron is simply that judicial deference to agencies
produces better consequences than nondeference”). Indeed, one way to characterize the spectrum of
support for deference to agencies is according to the relative concern assigned to those two prospects.
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restrictions on Chevron’s domain.342 On the other hand, Justice Thomas, the Court’s
most vocal critic of Chevron as of late,343 has been less reliable on that front.344 As to
so-called Step One determination, i.e. determinations whether statutory meaning is
“clear,”345 the suggestion above might seem to run contrary to Justice Scalia’s
observation that those “who find[] more often … that the meaning of a statute is
apparent” are more likely to think Chevron “desirable.”346 That remark, however, had
to do with propensity to see “apparent” meaning in general, something Justice Scalia
attributed a judge’s interpretive methodology.347 Holding interpretive methodology
constant, it is hard to tell whether a distaste for Chevron correlates with finding “clear”
meaning at Step One.348
Data aside, whether the epistemological insight discussed in this Article
recommends more or less deference to agencies thus turns on what, in a court’s view,
makes a decision whether to defer ‘high-stakes.’ If the major worry is exercise by the
executive branch of judicial authority, deference will seem appropriate even less often.
If, on the other hand, the more pressing concern is judge-made communications or
environmental policy, deference will appear proper all the more.

See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (holding that the Chevron framework does not apply to questions of deep
economic and political significance); City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1877-86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Chevron framework should not apply to “jurisdictional” constructions).
343 Compare Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(calling for Chevron to be reconsidered) with Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 967 (2005) (Thomas, J.) (holding that a reasonable agency construction
of a statute it administers supersedes any prior judicial construction).
344 See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874-75 (holding that the Chevron framework applies to
“jurisdictional” constructions).
345 E.g., Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83; see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 334, at 834 (characterizing
Chevron as establishing a “two-step deference regime”); but see Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 319
(arguing that Chevron’s two “steps” logically reduce to one).
346 Scalia, supra note 324, at 521.
347 Id. (contrasting “strict constructionalist[s]” with those who “abhor[] a ‘plain meaning’ rule, and [are]
willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the legislative history”). In
effect, Justice Scalia’s claim was that support for Chevron is inversely proportional to the frequency with
which one thinks the doctrine would make a difference. Empirical studies provide moderate support
for Justice Scalia’s observation. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823, 828-29 (2006) (finding that
“conservative” justices vote to validate agency decisions less often than “liberal” justices, noting that
“as an empirical matter, the more conservative justices (Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas)
have embraced ‘plain meaning’ approaches and the more liberal justices have not”).
348 As an empirical matter, this question is complicated by, for example, Justice Thomas’s shifting
assessment of Chevron. See supra notes 326-328 and accompanying text. Although Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas were consistently similar in terms of interpretive methodology, whether or at what point
their respective attitudes towards Chevron diverged is unclear, making a meaningful side-by-side
comparison difficult if not impossible.
342

50

IV. CODA: ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
As David Strauss and others have noted, courts adhere to constitutional text
much less closely than they do to the text of statutes.349 As with statutory
interpretation, courts insist that where constitutional text is “clear” or “unambiguous,”
the text controls.350 At the same time, pursuant to Chief Justice Marshall’s famous
reminder that “it is a constitution we are expounding,”351 courts frequently construe
constitutional text in ways that would be unimaginable in the modal statutory case. To
give two examples, courts agree that the First Amendment applies to all branches of
government despite the text instructing that “Congress shall pass no law ….”352
Similarly, courts accept that the Constitution bars suits in federal court by private
citizens against their home state353—this notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment’s
reference to suits “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”354
Given the inherently high-stakes nature of constitutional interpretation, one
might think that the epistemological insight discussed in this Article helps to explain
(or at least justify) the disparate treatment of constitutional text just described.355 For
reasons that Strauss articulates, however, it is hard to believe that courts are really
trying to read the constitutional text. First, claims like that “Congress,” as used in the
First Amendment, is a synecdoche referring to all branches of the federal
government356 are so at odds with ordinary norms of interpretation that, if true, would
seem to entail interpretive skepticism (to borrow Justice Scalia’s phrasing, if
“Congress” can mean all branches of government, the “[w]ords no longer have
meaning”357).358 Second, as Strauss observes, in the modal constitutional decision,
constitutional text serves at most a “ceremonial role,” with “the serious analysis

See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 42, at 3 (identifying various “anomalies,” i.e. “outcomes that are
inconsistent with established principles of constitutional law,” “that following the text of the
Constitution would produce”); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004) (discussing the disparity between the constitutional text
and the Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence).
350 See id. at 21 (observing that “it is not acceptable explicitly to ignore the text of the Constitution”); see
also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015) (arguing that courts rarely
if ever “explicitly repudiate” the original meaning of constitutional provisions).
351 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
352 U.S. CONST. amen. I (emphasis added).
353 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 1 (1890).
354 U.S. CONST. amen. XI (emphasis added).
355 Cf. Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Theory and the Activismometer: How to Think About Indeterminacy,
Restraint, Vagueness, Executive Review, and Precedent, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 403, 430-32 (2014)
(articulating a conception of “judicial activism” that reflects the “interest-sensitivity” of knowledge).
356 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 34 (2012).
357 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
358 See Strauss, supra note 42, at 30-34 (observing, among other things, that “[t]he other provisions [of
the Bill of Rights] refer to the ‘right’ of the people or of an individual, or they simply say that certain
actions are not allowed”).
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focus[ing] on the precedents.”359 In Strauss’s view, courts’ inattention to constitutional
text suggests that constitutional “interpretation” is really something like common law
adjudication, with constitutional text “treated in more or less the same way as
precedents in a common law system.” 360
Whatever courts are doing with constitutional text, it seems plain that what
they are not doing is attending to linguistic nuance. But if constitutional
“interpretation” is, as Strauss suggests, a misnomer,361 it is highly doubtful that the
connection between epistemological and practical reason discussed here sheds any
light on courts’ treatment of constitutional text vis-à-vis statutory text. Perhaps if
courts did care what the Constitution says, their ability to identify constitutional
meaning definitively would be limited by the would-be heightened practical stakes of
that task.362 On the other hand, perhaps discerning constitutional meaning would be
easier in some cases rather than others, owed not just to differences in textual clarity,363
but also to differences in the practical stakes.364 Regardless, because it is so speculative
to imagine what our constitutional order would look like if constitutional adjudication
consisted of careful reading, speculating about the implications of contemporary
epistemology for that would-be practice is not especially useful at this stage.

CONCLUSION
This Article is not so naïve as to suggest that all loose treatment of statutory
text is attributable to epistemological hurdles. Sometimes politics trumps text, right
or wrong. What this Article claims, more modestly, is that, as an epistemological
matter, there are limits to what one can reasonably expect of courts in high-stakes
See Strauss, supra note 42, at 8.
Id. at 4-5 (arguing that constitutional text is constitutional text is “expanded, limited, qualified,
reconceived, relegated to the background, or all-but-ignored, depending on what comes afterward”; see
also DAVID A. STRAUSS THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (articulating a common law theory of
constitutional adjudication). For an alternative, more eclectic non-originalist account, see, e.g., Mitchell
N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739
(2013) (suggesting that an array of non-linguistic factors help to determine constitutional law).
361 To the extent that “interpretation” is an inherently linguistic task. But see Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin
Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545,
546-50 (2013) (arguing that the phrase “constitutional interpretation” could refer either to the task of
discerning the constitutional text’s linguistic meaning or to that of determining the text’s legal
significance).
362 Seemingly, the heightened practical stakes of judicial review would push in favor of a Thayerian
approach to constitutional interpretation. See generally James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (recommending a highly deferential approach
to judicial review).
363 See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint, supra note 15, at 1287 (observing the relative clarity of
numeric constitutional provisions).
364 See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 657 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he constitutional text is quite specific on many low-stakes issues,
where agreement is more important to most political actors than achieving any particular outcome”).
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cases.365 Happily, courts seem committed for the most part to following statutory text
where “clear.” Courts can only do so, however, if it is epistemologically feasible. And,
for the reasons this Article explains, it is simply harder to “know” what a statute means
when the practical stakes are raised. Again, this is not to say that it is impossible to
discern statutory meaning in high-stakes cases, just that to do so is more difficult. The
purpose of this Article is thus not to excuse all deviations from text in big cases. It is,
instead, to recommend a bit more sympathy—and hence, a bit less cynicism—as the
Court goes about its work at the end of Term.

As a corollary, this Article suggests we ought to have more modest expectations of Congress when
drafting high-stakes legislation. Assuming that it is more “costly” for Congress to draft precise
legislative text, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 75, 103
(1983) (arguing that the costs associated with legislating precisely often leads legislatures to adopt “openended language”), an entailment of the observation here is that it is more difficult for Congress to speak
“clearly” when drafting legislation that is inherently high-stakes.
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